

CHOOSING SILENCE: THE UNITED STATES, TURKEY AND THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE

by

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ABSTRACT

Choosing Silence: The United States, Turkey and The Armenian Genocide

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My work is a comparative/ historical analysis of the Armenian Genocide, and how the denial and treatment of this genocide by Turkey and the United States has affected the social psychological wellbeing of succeeding generations of Armenians. I explore the literature that documents Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide, and I also consider the United State's political stance (or lack there of) on the denial.

I use historical sources (i.e. books, videotapes, scholarly journals, etc.) to compare the Armenian Genocide with other genocides (i.e. Jewish Holocaust, Rwanda, etc.), and I look specifically at the reasons behind the state-sponsored killings, methods of murder, and who were the killers. The majority of my thesis covers the Armenian Genocide, detailing what happened, how it happened and why it is denied. I draw on genocide studies and literature of the Armenian genocide. I use literature on collective memory/ collective identity in order to theoretically demonstrate ways in which collective knowledge and identities are formed.

One Purpose of my thesis is to concisely draw together literature that recognize the reality and effects of the Armenian genocide. The International community is faced with overwhelming evidence proving the Armenian Genocide happened and was in fact

State-sponsored under the Ottoman Empire's Turkish government. Even in the face of hundreds, if not thousands of survivor testimonies, archival photographs, documentation of first-hand eyewitness accounts by diplomats, missionaries, and reporters, there is still political and academic silence around discussion of the Armenian Genocide. The second purpose is to join my personal biography as a second generation Armenian American with the sociological imagination in order to shed light on Turkey and the United States' shared role in the distortion of history. Lastly, I draw on social movement literature in order to briefly document the developing international effort calling for the Turkish government's recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

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My grandfather was a survivor of the Armenian Genocide (one of the only members of his family to survive) and although he was not able to tell the story of his family's extinction, I am able to tell the story of his survival. This is my life's work, if not for him then for my father who came to America for "a better life." Though some would say he is a symbol of the "American Dream," his own dream of seeing the day in which the United States calls upon Turkey to admit their role in the Armenian Genocide has yet to come true. For a man who has been my teacher and my support system when I thought the loss of my mother was too much to bear, I dedicate my life's work in his name. Shukran baba!

In deepest thanks to Dr. Jennifer Eichstedt for her brilliance as not only a Race and Ethnicity professor, but also a mentor. I will forever be grateful for her unwavering belief in my work and constant support of my random ideas. I promise to use my "brilliant mind" for good in hopes of one day becoming at least half of the academic/activist she is. Simply giving "thanks" to Dr. Samuel Oliner, a survivor of the Jewish Holocaust, is an inadequate expression of my esteem and gratitude. Dr. Oliner is truly the epitome of altruism at its best. The knowledge I have acquired from our discussions will never be forgotten. Through my research I have learned the nature of evil, and because of him I will teach the nature of good. Many thanks to Dr. Betsy Watson for her persistence and guidance; my writing would not have been worth reading if it had not been for her constant critique of my thoughts and ideas.

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I would also like to thank my good friend and colleague Mark Bauermeister, who never let me fall “too deep” into my work and always kept it competitive. Best of luck my friend; GO CYCLONES! My sincerest gratitude is extended to two other members of my cohort: Lucy Stokes and Gisela Rutishauser, who not only weathered four semesters of graduate school with me, but without question kept my sanity afloat and sarcasm in tact. A special thanks to: Anna Hohl, F. Stearns, D. Clark, Z. Mohrmann, the Yamashita family, Yeran Attallah, Attallah Attallah and Tish Attallah for their continued belief in my work over the years. Researching and writing about genocide is undoubtedly a daunting task, and I lovingly thank Violet Hales for her steadfast support and patience.

Finally, for my mother, Antonia R. Attallah, I am incapable of expressing in words the feelings in my heart or thoughts in my head. You will truly never know the impact of my work, nor of your role in my growth, but if there is one thing I can say it was your grace and strength that brought me to this peak. If it matters at all here is your dedication... here is my thesis.

PREFACE

Sadly, the Turkish government can continue denying the Armenian Genocide – against all evidence – in great measure due to the complicity of the U.S. Administration, which, at Turkey’s urging, works against Congressional legislation commemorating this crime and has even nominated an Ambassador to Armenia, Dick Hoagland, who is on record denying that it was genocide.

-Aram Hamparian, Armenian National Committee of America Executive Director

No U.S. President has ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on.

-Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*

I should like to see any power in this world destroy this race; this small tribe of unimportant people whose wars have been fought and lost, whose structures have crumbled, whose literature is unread, whose music is unheard and whose prayers are no more answered. Go ahead, destroy this race! Destroy Armenia! See if you can do it. Send them away from their homes into the desert. Let them have neither bread nor water. Burn their homes and churches. Then see if they will not live again, see if they will not sing and pray again. For, when two of them meet anywhere in the world, see if they will not create a new Armenia.

-William Saroyan, (1908-1981)

Record Everything! Remember!

-Simon Dubnow, Famous Jewish Historian’s last words as he was driven to his death in the Nazi gas chambers

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

From the estimated age of four my grandfather lived as an Armenian in Diaspora (Homs, Syria). He was orphaned during the Armenian Genocide and survived one of the infamous Armenian caravan death marches into the Syrian Desert. A short time after his arrival into Syria his sister traded him for a loaf of bread to a Christian-Arab family (the Khalil's). Without question, the physical and mental hardships he faced during the Genocide¹ attributed to his poor health and mental anguish. My grandfather had only been living with the Khalil's a few days when they decided the burden was too great, and at the tender age of four he was left on the side of the road literally discarded with the trash. When a family friend noticed him they brought him back to the Khalil's preaching, "Do you not fear God...is this what you do to a Christian...a Son of God?" The family begrudgingly took him back, yet they did not give him the family name and instead gave him only the name *Attallah*. Ironically, the name *Attallah* means "Gift from God" in Arabic. The Khalil family raised him, but never acknowledged him as their son.

Growing up in Syria was hard for my grandfather; he was an outsider with no firm memory of his real mother or father. His true identity was in limbo; he wanted desperately to be loved by the Khalil family, and yet he craved the love of his family that perished. Members of his adopted family would call him "The Armenian Orphan" and

¹ As highlighted in Ronald G. Suny's "Truth Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians" (2005), "Genocide with a capital 'G' will be used in this article to refer to the Armenian Genocide of 1915, while genocide with a lower case 'g' refers to the phenomenon more generally. This usage is consistent with the now conventional employment of Holocaust with a capital 'H' to refer to the genocide of the Jews the by Nazis" (footnote 5).

“Armenian Refugee,” to quote my father, “They raised him up as you would raise a pet.” His memories of the Genocide were hidden far in the back of his young mind and would not fully be revealed until several decades later.

My grandfather dreamt of returning one day to his homeland for good, but due in large part to the effects he suffered from the Diaspora (i.e. loss of family, culture, language, etc.), he decided it was better to be a refugee-orphan in Syria, and know the language and people, than to be an orphan in Armenia and have no connection to anyone or anything. It was not until my father’s younger brother killed himself that my grandfather expressed signs of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which physicians related in large part to his memories and survival from the Armenian Genocide. Wertsch (2002) briefly touches upon PTSD by noting another author’s research:

Even months and years after a traumatic event, patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) continue to involuntarily reexperience aspects of the trauma. Reexperiencing can take the form of images, thoughts, perceptions, flashbacks, or dreams of the trauma. (P.107)

My father recalled the moment he realized my grandfather was reexperiencing flashbacks from the Armenian Genocide:

When our neighbors and family friends came by our home to pay their respects, my father would hide from them...he was frightened. These were his friends yet they were also Muslim, and in his mind he was brought back to the darkest point in his life, the Genocide. His memories began to flashback, and his instinct/response was to ‘run and hide from the Muslims’... he simply could not separate the two realities. The physicians I took him to told me that he was reverting back to a survival/coping mechanism from his past. Our neighbors understood his anxiety, because they knew what Armenians had gone through. It was clear his memories triggered the trauma long after the events had passed.

My father is seventy-two years of age, and like his father dreamt of returning one day to his ancestral homeland of Armenia, but because of the effects from the Armenian

Diaspora he too never let his dream become reality. My father told me that it was not until my grandfather confronted his memories of childhood that he was able to find peace. My grandfather had reclaimed his Armenianness, and with that he found a sense of meaning. He yearned for his lost family and wanted badly to know his true Armenian roots, but sadly the Diaspora and political denial from Turkey had already taken its toll on him. The confusion of the events (not only in his mind, but in international debate) only made things worse for his sense of identity. Even though the International community is faced with overwhelming evidence that proves the Armenian Genocide happened and was in fact State-sponsored under the Turkish government; there is still denial from Turkey. To deny the genocide and memories of those who survived not only distorts history, but also trivializes the death of 1.5 million Armenians and generations of decedents who frame their identity around the Armenian Cause.

Denial only strengthens the Armenian identity. Because of the Diaspora, Armenians are scattered around the world and potential family members, the people who can legitimate one's Armenian identity, are lost. To this day, ninety-two years after the start of the Armenian genocide, Armenians living in Diaspora continue to fight for recognition. We fight not just for the Genocide or loss of our homeland, but for our collective identities as Armenians. Collective identities are formed around the Genocide experience, and Genocidal memory plays an important role in what it means to be Armenian (Bakalian 1989; Paul 2000). The Armenian people, like other marginalized groups in society, have banded together in order to preserve a culture that was not lost, but forcefully taken from us ninety-two years ago. Bloodlines have been torn and

tattered, and history partially erased from memory...but whose memory? One is hard-pressed to find a person with Armenian heritage that does not know of the Armenian Genocide. United over the “Armenian Cause,” we re-claim our identity.

Our people are strong and resilient. We live with our history on a daily basis because we can feel the oppression of our ancestors in our bones. We have lost our homeland, and we have lost track of our bloodlines, but Armenians around the world cling to what little we have left – our memories. Halbwachs (1992) notes, “there are surely many facts, and many details of certain facts, that the individual would forget if others did not keep their memory alive for them” (p.182). I not only embrace my own childhood memories of my father teaching me about my Armenian orthodox heritage, but I hold onto his childhood memories as well. Through his heartbroken words I can picture him as a young boy being teased by his father’s adopted family for being *the son of an Armenian*. I can also see his eyes brighten as he tells me stories of townspeople who spoke highly of his father, because *he was* Armenian and therefore, must be “strong, noble and honest.” Mostly though, I hold onto my grandfather’s nightmares of the Genocide and the memories of countless Armenian Genocide survivors and witnesses, because as a surviving descendent it is all I have left of them.

My work is a comparative/ historical analysis of the Armenian Genocide, and how the denial and treatment of this genocide by Turkey and the United States has affected the social psychological wellbeing of succeeding generations of Armenians. I explore the literature that documents Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide, and I also consider the United State’s political stance (or lack there of) on the denial.

I use historical sources (i.e. books, videotapes, scholarly journals, etc.) to compare the Armenian Genocide with other genocides (i.e. Jewish Holocaust, Rwanda, etc.), and I look specifically at the reasons behind the state-sponsored killings, methods of murder, and who were the killers. The majority of my thesis covers the Armenian Genocide, detailing what happened, how it happened and why it is denied. I draw on genocide studies and literature of the Armenian genocide. I use literature on collective memory/collective identity in order to theoretically demonstrate ways in which collective knowledge and identities are formed.

One purpose of my thesis is to concisely draw together literature that recognize the reality and effects of the Armenian genocide. In Chapter Three: Genocide, I discuss the coining of the term and various processes of the act. The International community is faced with overwhelming evidence proving the Armenian Genocide happened and was in fact State-sponsored under the Ottoman Empire's Turkish government. Even in the face of hundreds, if not thousands of survivor testimonies, archival photographs, documentation of first-hand eyewitness accounts by diplomats, missionaries, and reporters, there is still political and academic silence around discussion of the Armenian Genocide. In chapter four: Policy of Denial, I discuss both Turkey and the United State's official (and unofficial) responses to the Armenian Genocide. The second purpose is to join my personal biography as a second generation Armenian American with the sociological imagination in order to shed light on Turkey and the United States' shared role in the distortion of history. Lastly, I draw on social movement literature in order to

briefly document the developing international effort calling for the Turkish government's recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The formation of this thesis has not come without loss and controversy. Two months before this thesis was to be completed, an unknown source hacked into my computer and all of my files (including my unfinished thesis) were deleted. Within 24 hours, a highly regarded non-profit educational website, documenting the Armenian Genocide had also been hacked into. The website's original content was erased and replaced with Turkish Nationalist Genocide denial propaganda. One week before the website was hacked into I had sent a detailed email notifying the site's host of my thesis, and I also requested information regarding sources I would be citing from their survivor archives. The website hacker(s) claim to be "grandchildren of the Ottoman Empire and children of Turkey," and are "in the service of Turk Nations." They staunchly reject any idea of the Armenian Genocide, and instead proclaim that Turkey was a victim at the hands of the Armenians. The most chilling part of their hate speech comes from the following statement (in broken English):

What says your freedom and human right ideas? Do not curse to our religion. NEVER MAKE TREACHERY TO OUR COUNTRY otherwise we will erase all of your sites from the internet... We hope that you meet with terrorists, and your police and soldiers are killed by terrorists, then maybe you can understand us. AFTER NOW YOU HAVE NO CHANCE TO MAKE A MISTAKE ABOUT TURKEY, IF YOU MAKE MISTAKE ABOUT TURKEY, YOU WILL SEE OUR HARD REACTION! We will never stop for hacking your sites. We hate from anybody who curses our police, soldiers, prime ministers and we will show our reaction as soon as to them.!!!!!!! BECAUSE!!!!!!! WE ARE IN THE SEVICE OF TURK NATIONS!!! (Cited directly from hacked website on 03.14.07, originally www.forgotten.org).

In fear for my own safety, and not knowing if there was a connection via the Internet and my email, I contacted the FBI. The case is still under investigation. I recognize that because of their work, genocide scholars around the world have faced and continue to face threats (on multiple levels) from “deniers.” Though I am by no means placing myself on the same level as Richard Hovannisian, Peter Balakian, Helen Fein, Vahakn N. Dadrian, Samuel P. Oliner, Israel W. Charny, or Taner Akçam, I believe their perseverance in bringing recognition to the world’s worst crimes against humanity is inspirational. The following work is by no means exhaustive; yet hopefully it will shed a brighter light onto the Armenian Cause and help give momentum to the movement.

CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE MEMORY/ COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

One Purpose of this thesis is to concisely draw together literature that recognize the reality and effects of the Armenian genocide. This chapter explores the topics of *collective memory* and *collective identity*, which are two integral pieces for discussion into *social movements*, more specifically *framing processes* within social movements. Analysis of collective behavior allows for a deeper understanding of collective memory/collective identity and vice versa. Theoretically, literature on collective memory/collective identity demonstrates ways in which collective knowledge and identities are formed.

Collective Memory

Collective memory is a term coined by Maurice Halbwachs (1992), who claims the collective memory is separate from individual memory in that it is shared, passed on and also constructed by the group, or modern society. “Memory is not knowledge of the past... it is knowledge from the past...” (Griffin 2004:544). “...it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories” (Halbwachs 1992:38). People have individual memories that are shared with other members of the same society/ culture to form a “collective memory” (Gongaware 2003; Halbwachs 1992; Schudson 1995). Individuals in the community rely on one another to aid memory of events. Constant exchanges and expressions of opinions help to bond the collective memory with the culture in which it grows out of

(i.e. shared memories). “Communities...have a history – in an important sense are constituted by their past – and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a ‘community of memory,’ one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget the past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative” (Olick and Robbins 1998:122).

Wertsch (2002) notes when a collective memory is not “grounded in direct, immediate experience of events” it is called “textually mediated” (p.5). An example would be individuals of Armenian heritage who share the same memories (e.g. recount the events) of the 1915-1923 Genocide, and yet never experienced the act itself. Wertsch (2002) also claims that in order to understand memory we must first understand the relationship between individual and collective memory, and how our memories are affected by such a relationship. Trying to draw distinctions between individual and collective memory processes is dangerous because it tends to “isolate the work of one discipline from that of another (Wertsch 2002:35). Wertsch (2002) chooses to use the term “remembering” as opposed to “memory” because he notes that memories are something we have, while remembering is something we do. By using the term “remembering” Wertsch implies a sense of agency and process.

The link between symbolic interactionism and collective memory is quite strong, because it is in fact through the interpretations of meaning and thought that we shape our understanding of events – in time becoming our memory and later our identity. We give meaning through discourse, and without words we would not be able to fully reconstruct our past. Halbwachs (1992) speaks to this idea when he asserts:

There are no recollections to which words cannot be made to correspond. We speak of our recollections before calling them to mind. It is language, and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, that allows us at every moment to reconstruct our past. (P.173)

Schudson (1995) also adds to the discussion of collective memory as part of symbolic interaction by asserting:

Collective memory may refer not to socially organized memories in individuals who experienced the past but to the socially produced artifacts that are the memory repositories for it- libraries, museums, monuments, language itself in clichés and word coinages, place names, history books and so forth. (P.348)

Collective memory can also be the, “image of the past held by individuals who did not themselves experience it but learned of it through cultural artifacts” (Schudson 1995:348). Halbwachs (1992) notes that when it comes to recollection, “the greatest number of memories come back to us when our parents, our friends, or other persons recall them to us” (p.38). Regardless of how the memory emerged – whether it is a personal experience, a memory handed down through personal artifacts, or simply a re-telling of events – memories are not tangible pieces of evidence. Even if memories are shared amongst countless individuals there is always someone or some group that sets out to weaken the memory by contesting and distorting it.

Memory Distortion

Schudson (1995) notes there are “at least four important and distinguishable process of distortion in collective memory: *Distanciation*, *Instrumentalization*, *Narrativization*, and *Conventionalization*” (p.348).

Distanciation – claims memory is reshaped through the passage of time and not only is detail lost, but so is emotional intensity (Schudson 1995:348). There are exceptions to this claim, as well as positive and negative attributes associated with Distanciation. In time people may gain historical perspective and memories may command public attention (i.e. private memories from the Holocaust). Also, in time people may be able to fully grasp ideas as well as formulate responses that originate from various new and open perspectives. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is a prime example of how and why individuals may “lose emotional intensity” on the surface but then reveal their true feelings at any point in time.

Instrumentalization – claims “memory selects and distorts in the service of present interests” (Schudson 1995:351). Basically, we select a particular version of the past that will serve our interests. Repression of information in order to frame an event in a certain light is another spin on instrumentalization. In the case of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide, Turkish officials staunchly oppose the use of genocide rhetoric to depict the events of 1915-1923. Instead of highlighting the fact that over a million Armenians were killed, Turks focus on the claim that anywhere between 300,000 to 600,000 Ottoman Turks were killed at the hands of the Armenians (Pope and Pope 1997). The Turkish government neglects to note that Armenians’ weapons were confiscated prior to deportation, or that two-thirds of the Armenian people lost their lives. Indeed the official Turkish rhetoric is that the Genocide was in reality a *civil war* and that Turks lost their lives too.

Narrativization – reports the past in an interesting way so that it can relate to the present – through the use of narrative (e.g. telling a story with a beginning, middle, and end.) (Schudson 1995:355, Gongaware 2003). An example would be (as cited above) Turkish depictions of the Armenian Genocide. Textbooks in Turkey talk about the *civil war* between the Armenians and the Turks.² Turks claim Armenians were going to stand with Russia and fight the Ottoman Turkish Empire in WWI, which meant Turkey had to *defend* itself. In Turkey it is assumed that *if* Armenians were killed it was only due to a civil war; Turks were killed too and that is why Turkish-Armenian relations are as they are today (Pope and Pope 1997). In order to justify their position of denial, Turkey perpetuates this story and similar ones to their youth and the world at large. “Turkey still cultivates its cherished taboo that the Armenian genocide never happened and is an invention of foreign propaganda” (Adam 2000:4).

Conventionalization – contends the past is not remembered as what happened but was “told” happened. The memory is not experienced but made up and believed because that is what was supposed to happen. When Turkish children tell the story of what happened between the Ottoman Turks and the Armenians during WWI, they tell the story of civil war and treason on the part of the Armenians. The only way to legitimately justify murder is to pose the victims as a “threat” and claim “self defense” (Charny 1982). Turks tell the stories that have been spoon fed to them in school, because those are the only justifications that would make sense of killing your neighbors. Turkish youths are

² Please note this is not a full description of events, I simply highlight this topic as an example of *Narrativization*, and I will discuss it further in the succeeding chapters.

told that Armenians not only opposed Turkish faith, but also were disloyal to the Ottoman Empire by secretly conspiring with the Empire's enemy at the time, the Christian Orthodox Russian Empire (Balakian 2003; Charny 1982; Fein 1979; Kuper 1981; Miller and Miller 1993; Pope and Pope 1997; Power 2002; Suny 2004; Werfel 1934). This argument holds strength in the Muslim community because historically the religion and the State have been one.

Michael Kammen (1995) speaks to the processes of distortion of memory by noting, "...undeniably, there are egregious instances of memory distortion whose sole or primary purpose is to legitimize a regime, empower a rising social class, or reduce (or even eliminate) the stigma of war crimes or inhumane atrocities" (p.340). Paul (2000) speaks to this same idea when she writes, "...the political state is 'the ultimate manipulator of memory as it reconstructs history to justify policies it wishes to pursue and to rationalize actions it has taken in the past'" (p.27). Wertsch (2002) claims a "central institution involved in the state control of collective memory is education" (p.68). As mentioned above, the Turkish Government does not teach the whole story in their textbooks and even their "shortened" version is extremely distorted.

Collective Identity

Conceptually, collective identity resides in a shared and interactive sense of "we-ness" and "collective agency" (Cerulo 1997; Eisenstadt 1998; Gongaware 2003).

Eisenstadt (1998) asserts:

Collective identity is not naturally generated but socially constructed: it is the intentional and non-intentional consequence of interactions, which in turn are

socially patterned and structured. Collective identity depends on special processes of induction of the members in the collectivity, ranging from various rites of initiation to various collective rituals. These attribute “similarity” among its members, as against the strangeness, difference and the distinction of the other. (P.140)

According to Eisenstadt (1998) the social construction of boundaries and solidarity is just one aspect of the processes. “Memory sites and memory practices are central loci for ongoing struggles over identity” (Olick and Robbins 1998:126; Eisenstadt 1998:143).

When boundaries of institutions coincide with boundaries of the group, collective identity is rooted in concrete behavior (Cornell 1996:282). Again, it is the Armenian Genocide that rallies collective memory, and it is such memory that has helped shape Armenians’ collective identity. Cornell (1996) notes the perception of shared interests is the key to collective identity, and such identity is often the lens through which we view the world (p.278). As depicted in William Saroyan’s monologue in the preface of this thesis, Armenians have united over the trauma of the Genocide and continue to rally around the Armenian Cause. “People and groups fight hard for their stories.” (Olick and Robbins 1998:126). Our sense of agency comes from our sense of Armenianness and our ties to our ancestors. Mobilization efforts revolve around our sense of Armenianness and the thought process behind every action begins with, “how will this benefit the Armenian Cause?”

CHAPTER 3: GENOCIDE

Genocide (as defined in the United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide): “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Coining of the Term Genocide

Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) coined the term *genocide* in 1944, but he began the fight for recognition of mass crimes against humanity decades earlier. Born and raised in Poland, Lemkin eventually studied Law at the University of Lvov law school. Lemkin was aware of the Armenian Massacres of WWI and was so horrified that a government could perpetrate such a heinous crime against its own citizens and not be punished, that in 1929 he, “...began moonlighting on drafting an international law that would commit his government and others to stopping the targeted destruction of ethnic, national, and religious groups” (Power 2002:21). In 1933 he presented a proposal to his European legal colleagues at the International Conference to Unification of Criminal Law outlining a law that would in effect ban “barbarity” and “vandalism” (Power 2002). “Punishing these two

practices – the destruction of groups and the demolition of their cultural and intellectual life – would occupy him fully for the next three decades” (Power 2002:22). Lemkin was essentially silenced at the conference; making a law for a crime that occurred in the past and may or may not occur again was not of high concern for his colleagues (Power 2002). Six years later Adolf Hitler invaded Poland (September 1, 1939) and began a reign of terror that would eventually culminate in the death of 6 million Jews and 5 million other “undesirables” living in Europe.

Being that Lemkin was a Jew, he and his family were targeted during this period of time by the German Nazi regime. Criminalizing acts that once only described the Armenian Massacres were now hitting close to home. Lemkin had fled to the United States without his family and began working towards an end to (or at least criminalization of) the mass slaughter of citizens by their own government. In 1944 Lemkin published a 712-page book outlining “the rules and decrees imposed by the Axis powers and their client states in nineteen Nazi-occupied countries and territories in Europe,” while also including a tighter version of his 1933 Madrid proposal (Power 2002:38-39). The new proposal included the term *genocide*: “a hybrid that combined the Greek derivative *geno*, meaning ‘race’ or ‘tribe’, together with the Latin derivative *cide*, form *caedere*, meaning ‘killing.’” (Power 2002:42). Lemkin cited the Armenian Genocide and Jewish Holocaust as prototypes of the crimes of genocide (Cohan 2005), and was the first person to “characterize the atrocities of 1915-1923 as the ‘Armenian Genocide’” (The Armenian Assembly of America 1988).

On December 9, 1948 Lemkin finally saw his law adopted by the United Nations in the form of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Definition adopted by the United Nations (UN) is as cited on the first page of this chapter and also stipulates that “punishable acts should include not only genocide itself but also ‘conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement of genocide;’ attempt to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide” (Rubenstein and Roth 2003:16). Lemkin’s original definition of genocide included not only ‘physical’ and ‘biological genocide’, but also ‘cultural genocide’ – which is the “destruction of the specific character of the persecuted ‘group’ by forced transfer of children, forced exile, prohibition of the use of the national language, destruction of books, documents, monuments, and objects of historical, artistic or religious value” (Kuper 1981:30). Due to controversy over the ‘cultural’ aspect of the definition, “...cultural genocide has disappeared as a crime under the Convention,” and is usually described as *ethnocide* (acts ‘with the intent to extinguish, utterly or in substantial part, a culture’) (Kuper 1981:31). The official definition still includes mention of “forced transfer of children from one group to another,” but the rest of Lemkin’s ‘cultural genocide’ definition has been discarded.

Scholarship of Genocide

It would take the United States 37 years to ratify the UN Convention on Genocide, but it finally happened in 1986, 27 years after Raphael Lemkin’s death (Power 2002). Without a doubt, Raphael Lemkin based his neologism in part to what happened to

the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia during 1915-1923, yet there is still little if any pressure at all by the International community to officially recognize the atrocities as Genocide (Cohan 2005). Many scholars have come up with their own definitions of genocide based on Lemkin's initial work and the definition adopted by the UN. The definition is constantly being re-worked so as to be inclusive and applicable to many instances of genocide that would otherwise be overlooked today.

One point that should be made here is that in order to objectively analyze the processes of genocide, one must understand both sides of the "story." Within his study, Christopher Browning (1988) discusses the importance of "understanding" both the victims and the perpetrators of genocide. Browning's words are on target and at times almost poetic. I could not express my stance any better and therefore reiterate Browning's words in hopes of clarifying any misunderstandings that may arise after reading my interpretations of various genocides – specifically the Armenian Genocide. Browning (1998) writes about the "ordinary men" that committed murder against innocent Polish Jews during WWII:

I must recognize that in the same situation, I could have been either a killer or an evader – both were human – if I want to understand and explain the behavior of both as best I can. What I do not accept, however, are the old clichés that to explain is to excuse, to understand is to forgive. Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving. Not trying to understand the perpetrators in human terms would make impossible not only this study but any history of Holocaust perpetrators that sought to go beyond one-dimensional caricature.
(P.xx)

Browning makes a very important point here, "Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving." Israel Charny (1982) makes a similar statement:

None of us are immune from the dangers of possibly becoming mass killers, and none of us are entirely lacking in humanity and decency. Whatever it is that makes people monstrous destroyers is somehow potentially in all of us. (P.2)

Both scholars clearly make the argument that in order to fully grasp the nature of genocide we must first try and explain the processes. Through various definitions of genocide, the following scholars have all contributed to an objective view of genocide in general, and the Armenian Genocide in particular.

According to Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) Jesse Bernard, “was the first social scientist to incorporate genocide into a coherent analysis” (p.12). In her 1949 work *American Community Behavior*, Bernard cites Lemkin when discussing the issues of racial and ethnic competition and conflict; she also “incorporates genocide as the ultimate weapon for resolving a conflict” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:12). In 1959 Pieter N. Drost (a Dutch law professor) wrote two volumes of work criticizing the UN’s definition of genocide because it did not include political groups (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) note Drost’s criticisms:

Rejecting the notion that the victims of genocide were limited to racial, religious, national, and ethnic groups, Drost proposed the United Nations redefine genocide as ‘the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such’ (Drost, 2:125). Drost also called attention to the long history of genocide... (P.13)

Drost was on the right track with his criticism of the UN definition, though his own definition fails to fully take into account group identity. Singling out “individuals” because of their “membership” to a “collective” may sound inclusive but really it just brings attention to the individual rather than the group. Genocide is large-scale destruction of entire peoples. I am not stating that recognition of the individual is not

important (I spent the entire second chapter of this thesis discussing the importance of the collective and individual identity), but I do think Lemkin's original idea for the *definition* was based on a government's intent to systematically eradicate a *group* of people based on their ethnic, national, or religious beliefs. Extermination or intent to exterminate a group, are the key ideas here.

Concepts of power and authority have a great deal to do with genocide in the sense that genocide is the quintessential State crime, since only a government has the power and authority to perpetrate such an act. One can substitute the word *Nation* here to help conceptualize what the *State* is. In 1980 Irving Louis Horowitz changed the UN definition of genocide – to emphasize the State's policy of using genocide to “assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society” – by asserting that genocide was “a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:13). Horowitz's definition brings discussion back to the State and the power it wields over its citizens. In 1975 Vahakn Dadrian took discussion of power one step further by emphasizing the intent of the perpetrator and discussing the power relationship between the perpetrator group and the victim group:

Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:14)

According to Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) Dadrian's five-category typology of genocide was as follows:

(1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator's aim; (2) latent genocide, in which the perpetrators activities have unintended consequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental spread of disease during an invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed to punish a segment of a minority that challenges a dominant group; (4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to obtain control of economic resources; and (5) optimal genocide, in which the chief aim of the perpetrator is the total obliteration of the group, as in the Armenian and Jewish holocausts. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:14-15)

Dadrian's work on the "intent of perpetrators" is excellent, though his definition of genocide poses several issues. It seems that in an attempt to be all-inclusive Mr.

Dadrian's definition becomes too far-reaching. His inclusion of "latent genocides" undermines the original meaning behind Lemkin's work, and he leaves the definition up for too much interpretation.

Sociologist Helen Fein has defined and redefined her own definition of genocide, and in 1988 she resolved many questions regarding her previous definitions by "devising a revised sociological definition of genocide" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:16). Fein's revised definition included "political and social groups" and excluded deaths resulting from warfare; she also states, "individuals and not only states and other authorities can be perpetrators of genocides" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:16). Fein's 1988 definition is as follows:

Genocide is a series of purposeful actions by a perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity through mass or selective murders of group members and suppressing the biological and social reproduction of the collectivity. This can be accomplished through the imposed proscription of restriction of reproduction of group members, increasing infant mortality, and breaking the linkage between reproduction and socialization of children in the family or group of origin. The perpetrator may represent the state of the victim, another state, or another collectivity. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:16)

Fein's definition adds clarification to Drost's definition of victims by mentioning the destruction of a "collectivity" through either "mass or selective murders of group

members.” Though Fein’s definition is obviously the most solid at this point, I find her omission of the term “one-sided mass killing” problematic. To claim the State is not the ultimate authority in cases of genocide is completely problematic. Assuming that marginalized groups have power to perpetrate genocide without help from the state (I’ll discuss the processes of genocide shortly) is dangerous because it once again leaves the definition up for interpretation.

According to Fein’s definition incidents of civil war could be termed genocide, which is incredibly problematic in terms of justification. Take, for example, a case where a specific group is targeted for extinction and an unprecedented number of people are killed. Due to reasons of fear the surviving members of this targeted group then fight back against members of the group that perpetrated the original attack. What seems like a clear-cut case of “self-defense” is no longer framed as such under Fein’s definition and would therefore be defined as “bi-lateral genocide.” Genocides are often framed as *civil* wars in an attempt to take responsibility off of the State. Fein’s definition undermines the power of the State and takes attention off of the real perpetrators. In all cases of genocide there have been innocent people murdered on both sides. I am not justifying murder of human beings, and I do not claim that simply because one is a member of a targeted group that their victimization of another human being is not wrong, but as stated earlier in this chapter, context of the situation is of the utmost importance and *empathy* is not necessarily *justification*.

Comparative analysis of genocide has significantly contributed to more objective definitions of genocide, and according to Chalk and Jonassohn (1990), “Leo Kuper has

contributed more to the comparative study of the problem of genocide in the twentieth century than anyone since Raphael Lemkin” (p.16). Kuper has argued for inclusion of “political groups” in the UN Convention, yet he “reluctantly accepts” the use of the UN Convention’s current definition because it is “internationally recognized and may one day become the basis for more effective preventative action by the United Nations” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:17). Kuper’s contribution to genocide scholarship has made his work seminal to the field, especially his discussion on the processes of genocide. With that said, his comparative work includes many large-scale massacres that honestly do not have much in common (some do not even fall under the UN Convention’s definition) and therefore he places them in his own category of “genocidal massacre and related atrocities.” Due to the fact that he uses the UN definition genocide, if any of the cases he’s comparing involve, “...an attempt to destroy a class or social group, Kuper must omit them from his typology of genocide” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:18). His grouping of certain massacres together are often problematic due to the fact the “intent” of the perpetrators in each case is not universal. Processes of genocides show that no genocide is the same as any other because genocidal methods, justifications, numbers of dead, etc., are all different.

Robert Melson had done a considerable amount of work on “genocidal processes” and has on several occasions published work comparing the Armenian and Jewish Genocides (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Melson (1992) defines genocide as:

A public policy mainly carried out by the state whose intent is the destruction in whole or in part of a social collectivity or category, usually a communal group, a class, or a political faction. (P.26)

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) summarize Melson's thesis using an excerpt from his own work:

We would suggest that four factors preceding the Armenian genocide may be at work in other cases as well. First, the victimized group is a communal minority that was tolerated but was by no means considered as equal to the majority. Indeed, it was a communal group that had historically experienced some persecution and contempt at the hands of the larger society. Second, despite this history – or perhaps because of it – for some years preceding the genocide, the group that will come to be victimized adapts with relative success to the modern world and undergoes progress in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres. This social mobilization creates new tensions between this minority and segments of the majority who find its progress to be both illegitimate and threatening to the old order which was based on inequality. Third, the victimized group comes to be identified, either geographically or ideologically, with the enemies of the larger society and state. This identification may be real or may be imputed to the minority, but a link is established between an external and internal threat. Fourth, the larger society and the state experience a series of significant military and political disasters that undermine their security and worldview.

Together these factors allow for the emergence of an ideology that links the crisis of the state and the majority to the social mobilization or progress of the minority and to its outside connections with the state's enemies. The progress of the minority is seen as having been gained at the expense of the majority and the targeted group if blamed for the disasters engulfing the state and the larger society. In the grip of its new ideology the state radically redefines its identity and decides to eliminate the offending communal group from the social structure.

It is this fateful convergence of a minority's renaissance and its connections to the outside world with the majority's disasters, fear of external aggression, and transformation of ideology and identity that seems to us to be at the core of both the Armenian and Jewish genocides. (P.19)

Again, though no genocide is the same as another there are similarities, and Melson's model is "relevant to most state-sponsored domestic genocides" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).

Roger W. Smith (1987) presents a "five-part typology of genocide based on the motives of the perpetrator" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:22). Smith's typology is as follows:

(1) retributive genocide, which is based on the desire for revenge (for example, the conquests of Genghis Khan); (2) institutional genocide, frequently incidental to military conquest and prevalent in the ancient and medieval worlds; (3) utilitarian genocide, motivated by the desire for material gain and common in the colonial expansions of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries as well as the genocides of development devastating small aboriginal groups in the twentieth century; (4) monopolistic genocide, originating from the desire to monopolize power, particularly in plural societies (for example, Bangladesh and Burundi); and (5) ideological genocide, motivated by the desire to impose a particular notion of salvation or purification on an entire society and most commonly found in the twentieth century (for example, the Armenians, the Soviet Union, the Holocaust, and Cambodia). (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:22)

Smith places great emphasis on historical context when locating the various motives of the perpetrator. He shows and makes the claim that, “victims of modern genocides are usually selected according to who they are, whereas those of earlier genocides were generally chosen because of where they were or what they had” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:22). Leo Kuper, Helen Fein, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, among others have based their work on the same conclusion (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) have also rejected the UN definition of genocide and instead focus on extreme cases of mass-murder. *“Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator”* (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:23). At this time I believe their typology is one of the best in Genocide Studies. The authors very clearly state a greater need for the use of the term “ethnocide” rather than genocide for instances when “...a group disappears without mass killing,” because “...the suppression of a culture, a language, a religion, and so on is a phenomenon that is analytically different from the physical extermination of a group” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:23). The authors use “one-sided” to emphasize cases where there is no reciprocity; the

intention to wipe out an entire group is one sided. Again *intention* is a key word here and the authors explain in detail their intentions for the term:

The term *one-sided mass killing* is also essential in order to exclude from our analysis the casualties of war, whether military or civilian. When countries are at war, neither side is defenseless. Although individually the civilians may be defenseless, they are part of the group or nation that is at war. In our analysis, the group is the operable unit of analysis because we are concerned with the behavior of groups rather than individuals. Although our case materials include genocides that occurred during or after a war, these are not to be interpreted as exceptions because they do not concern the victims of combat. The genocide of the Armenians occurred during World War I, that of the Gypsies and Jews during World War II; but in neither case were the victims killed as a result of the warfare.

A further implication of *one-sided* is that the victim group has no organized military machinery that might be opposed to that of the perpetrator. Even in those cases in which the victims engaged in attempts to oppose the power of the perpetrators, the very hopelessness of such attempts underscores the one-sidedness of these mass killings. Isolated attempts to oppose the perpetrator – the Warsaw Ghetto uprising or the defense of Van, for example – serve more to assert the solidarity of the victims than to defeat the perpetrator.

Genocides are always performed by a *state or other authority*. In the twentieth century, the perpetrator is almost always the state because authority and power are highly centralized and the modern means of communication are so efficient that such centralization can be effectively imposed. (P. 24-26)

Chalk and Jonassohn's definition emphasizes the group, intent, and who the perpetrators are in genocide. The authors do a wonderful job of resolving any questions one might have had with previous definitions and advocate wider use of the term "ethnocide."

Though each of the definitions above varies in some form, they all fall under the basic definition Raphael Lemkin proposed in his first proposal in 1933. "...in spite of their occasional differences students of genocide are close to a consensus about the essential components of the core cases in the field" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:22). Like Kuper, Fein, and Chalk and Jonassohn, I too follow the notion that victims of modern genocides

are selected because their ethnic, national, religious, or even political affiliations do not correspond with the perpetrator's (state or governing authority) ethnic, national, religious or political group membership. I also ascribe to Chalk and Jonassohn's definition of genocide and their explanation of the processes behind the act.

Power, Authority and Processes of Genocide

As I mentioned earlier, genocide is the quintessential State crime whereby only a government has the power and authority to perpetrate such an act. No genocide could occur without authorization and certainly not without the power held by individuals such as Mussolini, Talaat Pasha (Ottoman Turkish leader), or Nazi Dictator Adolf Hitler to only name a few. There are a variety of human behaviors; on one end of the spectrum there is altruism and on the other end there is genocide. There are a number of processes that happen prior to genocide and a pattern of set actions that occur within the phenomenon.

Power and Authority

In order to fully address how a State has the power and authority to commit such a calculated and hateful act as genocide I must first address definitions and uses of power, and legitimate and illegitimate authority. Power is a capability and ultimately authority. One cannot discuss issues of power without mentioning the interlocking and sometimes interchangeable concepts of privilege and authority.

Steven Lukes (1974) discusses power inequalities built into the relationships we have with people in society, and by doing so he indirectly speaks of 'life chances' and how certain people have the power to determine other people's life chances. Regardless of geographical location not everyone has equal access to equal resources. Lukes' radical view of power addresses this issue by noting that simply because conflict is not observed does not mean power relationships are not being used. With power comes privilege and vice versa. Within each society there are various institutions, and within these institutions there is a systemic power struggle between subordinate and dominant groups who all are vying for a position at the top. Each person in society has been socialized to believe and respect certain social scripts and values. Ironically it is the very social institutions people have trusted and believed in that have been constructed to oppress the masses.

Lukes (1974) brings up Robert Dahl's notion of power and influence in his second-dimensional view of power whereby, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Domhoff 1998:17; Lukes 1974:17). This view is one held by pluralists and is a, "very individualistic notion of power because they fundamentally believe that power exists within self constituted subjects who release their power to the State" (Eichstedt 1992:5). To assume that anyone (regardless of social position in society) can wield power over another and to claim power is a "pre-existing resource into which anyone can tap" (Eichstedt 1992:6) is extremely problematic. Such an idea assumes that people are in fact treated equally and that the distribution of power in society is equal as well. In reality the State controls the people even if it is a so-called Democracy. Dahl's theory of power is often thought of as

the ability to use coercion as a means to perpetuate hierarchical systems of oppression. As a pluralist, Dahl believed that everyone had access to power but a more accurate typology would be from C. Wright Mills.

C. Wright Mills (1956) was somewhat of a Marxist in that he believed there was an elite group within society that wielded their power over the “public” through the use of military, government (i.e. political elite), and corporate means (i.e. finance). Mills (1956) states that through such means these “power elites” in America are the ones who rule, they make the decisions that govern and as a public we follow them. Since power is exercised through institutions, Mills theory of power debunks Dahl’s idea that power is open to the public. Mills states, “...power is not of a man... To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and hold these valued experiences” (Mills 1956:11). Mills basic “power elite” argument falls directly in line with the ideas of William Domhoff. Like Lukes, Domhoff calls for a deeper analysis of why, “a small group of privileged folks have the power and authority to basically shape the economy and the government for their own benefit” (Domhoff 1998:1). Mills (1956) focuses on the institutional analysis of power, while Lukes (1974) and Domhoff (1998) attempt to bring the definition of power full circle and include the role of class (Domhoff 1998), race, gender, etc. (Lukes 1974). Though Mills and Domhoff focus on Power relations in the United States of America it is argued here that their analysis could be applied to any Nation State.

Domhoff (1998) draws from Weber's conception of power to define power as the, "ability to produce unintended and foreseen effects on others" (Eichstedt 1992:14). Weber looks directly at the State and how the State wields power over individuals. He privileges the, "consideration of structure over/against a consideration of individuals" (Eichstedt 1992:16). In his various arguments he not only addresses coercion and manipulation of compliance through what we call "sanctions" (i.e. laws/rules) but also the idea of authority. So then, one must note that authority and legitimacy of authority are key concepts to keep in mind when analyzing power relations. Weber asserts that people do things because they truly believe in the legitimacy of an order; one adheres to orders because, "disobedience would carry disadvantageous consequences" (Weber 1947:124). The legitimacy of an order occurs in two key ways (1) purely disinterested motives (affectual, rational belief in the absolute validity as an expression of absolute values, or religious attitudes); (2) purely motivated by self interest. The basis of legitimacy as an order can be categorized into four distinct ways: (1) by tradition; a belief that the legitimacy has always existed; (2) by affectual attitudes; not based on rational values but rather emotions; (3) by belief in absolute value; belief in what is right/wrong, true/false; (4) legal; people follow the order because they believe it has been established as legal and therefore they must agree to accept the rule as legitimate (Weber 1947:130).

Weber (1947) then moves on to discuss how change comes about, and he argues that since we believe in social order because it is legitimate we then respond to the "legitimate authority" giving that order. Legitimate Authority is based on three conditions: (1) Rational Legal; belief in the 'legality' of patterns of rules; (2) Traditional;

belief in the sanctity of tradition and that of the person; (3) Charismatic; the belief in the heroic nature/exemplary character of the person (personal quality) (Weber 1947). Weber (1947) expects society to evolve into a more rational/ legal authority, one that is administered by a bureaucratic administrative staff. Rational/ legal authority is very impersonal, effective, and has rules, constitutions, and laws to follow that gives said leader authority. Weber (1947) argues the only change that comes from a rational/ legal authority will be evolutionary – not revolutionary – change. Traditional authority receives legitimacy from a higher order within the past. Even though traditional authority cannot sustain scientific, rational, and legal critique, people ascribe to this authority because of tradition and the belief it has always existed.

Finally, there is charismatic authority in which the, “term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men” (Weber 1947:358). According to Weber (1947) people will follow charismatic people because they have exceptional qualities and his/her validity is based on his/her qualities. One might think of individuals like Mother Teresa, Gandhi, Jesus, etc. when thinking of charismatic authority figures, but also Pasha, Hitler, and Stalin. Weber says social change comes about through charisma so that, “Within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force” (Weber 1947:361-362). Weber (1947) notes that charismatic authority is never stable, because one cannot pass on one’s own charisma to another. Therefore, once charisma is lost we have chaos and it, “becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both” (Weber 1947:364). In any case Weber believed

change came from charismatic authority, and unlike Marx he claimed that society could change its practices not from the masses of people but from a person who is in a high position in society.

What Lukes (1974) is proposing with the third-dimensional view is simply a “deeper analysis of power relations” and a more conscious theoretical approach to how such power relations affect the life chances of others. “The different types of power may combine in different ways in different times and places” (Domhoff 1998:18). In his radical view of power Lukes (1974) is combining Dahl’s definition of power with Weber’s (1947) concepts of legitimacy/ legitimate authority. By interweaving these separate concepts Lukes (1974) is taking the definition of power further. Lukes’ definition goes beyond Dahl’s and Weber’s, because he insists the true basis of power should be an issue for empirical study and that to simply limit the definition to, “the ability to use force or coercion on the other person or group” is merely a limitation of our language. The first two views Lukes describe focus too heavily on “observable conflict” and an individualist view of power. The third-dimensional view shows that latent conflict (i.e. normalizing cultural forms) and real issues like racism, sexism, genderism, etc. are in fact power relationships that must not be overlooked. Therefore to actually pay heed to these issues is somewhat of a radical concept (i.e. radical view of power). Again, the radical view Lukes (1974) advocates asserts that simply because conflict is not observed does not mean power relationships are not present. There is a web of institutional discrimination in society that either grants you privilege or oppression. Whether or not

we chose to see the relationships that are a product of the web is our own choice, regardless these relationships are still there and do in fact effect people's life chances.

Now that I have reviewed the literature surrounding genocide scholar's definitions of genocide and deconstructed/ documented various work on power and authority, I will bring the scholarship of genocide full circle by discussing the various processes to genocide and provide examples of genocides that follow the basic processes outlined.

Processes of Genocide

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:29) have come up with a typology of genocide according to the perpetrator's motive:

1. To eliminate a real or potential threat;
2. To spread terror among real or potential enemies;
3. To acquire economic wealth; or
4. To implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology

Within genocide there are four groups people fall into: (1) Killers, (2) Victims, (3) Rescuers, and (4) Bystanders.

Killers – are the *perpetrators* of genocide; the killers are not only the individuals committing the actual crimes but are also the individuals giving the commands/orders (the leaders in authority/ the State). As noted earlier from the statements of Christopher Browning (1988) and Israel Charny (1982), depending on the context of the situation we are all capable of committing genocide. In his seminal research series of 1965, Stanley Milgram found that, "Given the instructions of an authority, a majority of people from all

socioeconomic levels are capable of doing serious, perhaps even lethal, harm to fellow human beings” (Charny 1982:14). Charny (1982) quotes Vahakn Dadrian’s typology of genocide – specifically his work on perpetrators of genocide:

Among the components of the initiator, the first rank is occupied by the decision-makers, the central authorities. Their chief contribution lies in their supplying the three essentials for such perpetration, namely, legitimation, authorization and rationalization... The decision-makers are not only crucial in terms of conceiving of genocide, but far more importantly, in terms of motivating the rank and file of their cohorts as instruments of design and execution of genocide. (P.201)

Victims – are the individuals who based on group membership are targeted by the killers for eradication via routines set in place by the State.

Rescuers – are the individuals who risk their own lives to bring aid to the victims of genocide. In their study of altruistic personalities during the Jewish Holocaust, Oliner and Oliner (1988) state, “If perpetrators and collaborators constitute the tragedy of this human experience, rescuers constitute its hope” (p.xvii).

Bystanders – are the individuals who stand idly by while the killers commit genocide on the victims. Bystanders are willfully ignorant of the crimes taking place and rather than act they simply do nothing. When someone is *unaware* they are simply *ignorant*, but when people have knowledge and do nothing with such knowledge, they are *willfully ignorant*. For example, we are all currently bystanders to the genocide in Darfur, we have knowledge of the events taking place but we have yet to stop them. The more uninformed people are the more willing they are to believe the lies. When you are a bystander evil triumphs because no one does anything...indifference kills.

Before genocide can take place, there must be several steps taken (processes).

Based on Herbert Kelman's (1973) study, I have gathered the following five-basic/typical processes of genocide:

1. Dehumanization of victims (ex. Scapegoating)
2. Authorization of mass-murder (ex. giving orders).
3. Routinization (ex. well carried out bureaucratic procedure- well organized).
4. Murder
5. Denial

Dehumanization of the victims – is the first step the State takes to ensure support for their eventual plan to eradicate a certain group from society. "...the other people are defined not only as intrinsically less valuable, but as not of our kind, even as not of our species" (Charny 1982:190). Dehumanization cannot occur if members of the perpetrator group (potential murders at this point) do not accept the new definition of the victim group as "undesirable" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). According to Charny (1982), "Dehumanization is at the heart of the destructive process; it provides the necessary rationalization for the destruction" (p.206).

Authorization of mass-murder – comes from the leaders in authority/ the State. "Leaders and institutions sanction and progressively legalize destruction of victims. Persecution of a group is pursued as a major legitimate and major goal of the society. Victimization is socially acceptable (even when there are laws against it)" (Charny 1982:313).

Routinization – is the well-organized and well-carried out bureaucratic procedure of rounding up members of the victim group and systematically planning ways to totally eradicate them from existence.

Murder – is the actual event in the processes where victims are executed by whatever means the state has authorized as appropriate. This part of the process begins when the killers take action. Contrary to public belief, genocide does not simply end with a “mass execution of victims.”

Denial – is the final stage in the process of genocide; the *perpetrators* deny involvement in the act of genocide by either downplaying the severity of their actions or simply denying genocide altogether. Often times the perpetrators will pass blame onto another population within their society and call the genocidal acts a *civil war*. Since genocide is a State-sponsored act, the *perpetrators* would be the *State*. Richard G. Hovannisian (2001) speaks on the topic of genocide denial when he writes:

It has been said that denial is the final phase of genocide. Following the physical destruction of a people and the foundations of their culture, memory is all that is left and is targeted as the last victim. Complete annihilation of a people requires the banishment of recollection and the suffocation of remembrance. Falsification, deception, and half-truths reduce what was to what may have been or perhaps what was not at all. Senseless terror gives way to reason, violence adapts to explanation, and history is reshaped to suit a contemporary agenda. By altering or erasing the past, a present is produced and a future is projected without concern about historical integrity. (P.1-2)

The processes of genocide can only begin to end when the State in question takes responsibility for their actions and is held accountable by the International Court. It is only at this point when healing can begin and the victims’ decedents can forgive, because without recognition of fault there can be no forgiveness. Analyzing the processes of

genocide gives individuals the chance to understand current examples of genocide more critically and explore the various histories of genocide with more objectivity, and vice versa. It is always important to be aware of historical context in academia and genocide studies are no exception. Before we as an international community, can even begin to solve the current genocides raging on in the world today, we must first look to our past for guidance.

Histories of Genocide

Before the Jewish Holocaust there was the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923 and before that the Hamidian Massacres of 1895-1896. During the last decade of the 19th century and first few decades of the 20th century the world was witness to some of the most heinous crimes against humanity ever recorded in history. The Jewish Holocaust has become *the* major example of genocide and is often referred to as precedent in terms of comparing processes of potential genocides. Today we compare mass murders around the world to that of the Jewish Holocaust and the loss of six million Jews³, yet the Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1896 was the first large-scale massacre the world had seen. What happened to the Armenians and all other Christian minorities⁴ living in the

³ For the purpose of simplification I have only noted Jews in the text, though by no means were they the only marginalized group singled out by the Nazi regime for extermination; Homosexuals, Gypsies, Political Prisoners, and the Mentally and Physically Disabled, were targeted for extermination in large numbers. For a compelling analysis, see, Rubenstein and Roth, *Approaches to Auschwitz* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003).

⁴ Again, for the purpose of simplification, I have only noted Armenians (and will continue to do so throughout this thesis) as those persecuted under the Ottoman Turkish Empire during 1915-1923. Though by no means were Armenians the only group targeted by the Turks for persecution; Assyrians, Chaldeans, Greeks and all other Christians living in the Ottoman Empire were targeted

Ottoman Empire during WWI was simply a crime without a name, the term genocide had not yet been coined but the magnitude of the events still hit a core.

Brief History of Armenian Genocide

Due to the scope of such a large-scale event that not only spread the span of a desert but also that of decades, it is important to note the following discussion is by no means exhaustive but should be a sufficient account of the events that led up to the Ottoman Turkish Empire's systematic deportation and extermination of the Ottoman Armenians during 1915-1923. Scholars such as Richard Hovannisian, Peter Balakian, Ronald G. Suny, Vahakn N. Dadrian, Israel W. Charny, and Taner Akçam, among others, have contributed an immense amount of valuable material regarding the Armenian Genocide and should be referenced for further detailed accounts.

History of Ottoman Empire.

In 330 A.D. Constantine I moved the Roman (Byzantine) Empire's capital from Rome to Byzantium – once Constantinople, now present day Istanbul – in Anatolia (Pope and Pope 1997).⁵ The Seljuk Turks were part of the 10th Century Oguz Turks migration westward from Central Asia into Anatolia (Pope and Pope 1997). “The Seljuk and Byzantine armies clashed at Malazgirt (Manzikert) north of Lake Van in 1071, an action

for expulsion and/or extermination, yet the Armenian population was specifically targeted, and is the base group for this thesis.

⁵ Anatolia is commonly referenced as *Asia Minor* and is a land mass surrounded by three seas (the Black Sea to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the south, the Aegean Sea to the west) with the bulk of the Asian mainland surrounding it in the east. (See Appendix A for a visual).

still commemorated at the battlefield each year as one of the turning points in Turkish history” (Pope and Pope 1997:15). During the 13th century, the Mongols invaded Anatolia and in 1299 Osam I declared independence of the Ottoman State (Pope and Pope 1997). “Named after the first great leader, Osman, the Ottoman dynasty emerged at the end of the thirteenth century” (Pope and Pope 1997:24). Cohan (2005) notes the early history of the Ottoman Empire:

The Seljuk Turks began to inhabit Anatolia as early as the eleventh century and by 1453 their descendents, the Ottoman Turks, had captured Constantinople (now Istanbul), firmly establishing the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational state that incorporated several ethnic groups including the Armenians. (Cohan 2005:333)

Historic Armenia – what is now Eastern Turkey (See Appendix A) – was once a vast, occasionally powerful, and always proud empire with a long and bloodied past. Fein (1979) describes the history of the Armenians settlement as such:

According to legend, the Armenians have lived around Mount Ararat since 2350 B.C.E. and are descended from Haig, a scion of Noah. But scholars ascribe their origin to a migration of Indo-European peoples from Thrace during the twelfth or thirteenth centuries B.C.E. Between 600 B.C.E. and 428 C.E., the Armenian nation was a protectorate of Persia and Rome (excepting a brief period when a native dynasty was sovereign) until it was absorbed by the Parthian Empire in 428 C.E. The Armenians were the first state to establish Christianity (301 C.E.) and retained their autonomous Christian church, despite being later overrun by Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols, and Mamelukes prior to the Ottomans. (P.5)

In the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the Ottoman Empire ceded a small part of her traditional Armenian homeland to the Russian Empire, known as Eastern Armenia, while Western Armenia remained under Ottoman Sovereignty.

Turkey currently claims to be a secularist Nation State, however, it is predominately Muslim and the current political party in charge is tied to Islamic

Fundamentalist roots. Historically in Islamic tradition there has been little difference between the State and the religion, at times they were one in the same. Prior to WWI, the Muslim Ottoman Turks controlled much of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern landmass. The Turks in power believed all non-Muslims were un-equal to Muslims and therefore regarded as *infidels* (Balakian 2003). During the final years of the 19th century, Turkey lost a substantial amount of territories to the UK, Russia, France, Greece, etc. After the Ottoman Empire fell to the Russians in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 the Treaty of Berlin (1878)⁶ (a revised version of the Treaty of San Stefano 1878) was signed, but never fully enacted. The signed treaty may have stated that Christian's status was somewhat "protected" and "equal" but defacto it was not. The Turkish government continued to treat the non-Muslim citizens of the empire (i.e. Armenians, Greeks, Russians, etc.) as second-class citizens. Several examples of Armenians marginalized status in the Ottoman Empire are as follows: Armenians were exempt from serving in the military, and yet forced to pay an exemption tax (the *jizya*); Armenians were not allowed to bear arms (Turkish authorities supposedly feared an Armenian revolt, an argument eventually used by the Young Turks to justify their deportation/extermination of the Ottoman Armenians); Armenians' testimony in Islamic courts was prohibited against Muslims, and most apparent was the heavy taxes that fell upon any Armenian living in the Ottoman Empire (Astourian 1990; Balakian 2003; Cohan 2005; Melson 1992; Miller and Miller 1993).

⁶ Sara Cohan notes that the treaty "...included a clause that would provide more rights for Ottoman Armenians, including fair taxation practices, protections from tribal attacks, and the right to give evidence in Ottoman Courts of Law." (2005:334).

The Ottoman's control and power over the Empire began dwindling at the end of the 19th century, and in the late 1890's Armenians began protesting and demanding equal treatment under the Treaty of Berlin (Balakian 2003; Cohan 2005; Miller and Miller 1993; Melson 1992; Pope and Pope 1997). Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, (ruler of the Ottoman Empire from August 31, 1876 to April 27, 1909), knew his only chance to gain a stronghold on the Eastern part of Anatolia and create/maintain a Pan-Turkic empire would be to rid Anatolia of the Christian Armenians. Armenians inhabited the heart of the Ottoman Empire and with threats from Russia looming, Abdul-Hamid II was not about to lose the Eastern part of Anatolia to another group of Christians. The events that took place next, are referred to as the "Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1896."

Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1896.

During the Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1896, scholars estimate that 100,000 to 300,000 Armenians were killed throughout the Ottoman Empire (Cohan 2005:335). Rubenstein and Roth (2003) cite Armenian casualties in the range of 100,000 to 200,000 killed in 1895-1896 alone (p.18).⁷ Though actual numbers vary, the events were so brutal and merciless, that they later became the precedent for large-scale mass murder in the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1918.

⁷ Cohan (2005) actually notes "100,000 to 300,000. Richard G. Hovannisian cites as little as 80,000 Armenians murdered in 'The Armenians in Turkey', in *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*, ed. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (Durham, NC: Yale University Press, 1990):254-255.

The Massacres began when Armenians demanded equal treatment and protection under the Ottoman Empire. According to Balakian (2003):

In June [1894], in the villages of Talori *nahiye* (subdistrict), an Ottoman official, accompanied by *zaptiye* (military police), arrived to collect overdue taxes. The Armenian men met them and told them that they were willing to pay government taxes if the government would protect them from Kurdish extortion. According to British consul R. W. Graves in Erzerum, the Ottoman official 'proceeded to abuse and maltreat them.' Then, as the British consul put it, the Armenian men finally 'lost their temper, fell upon him, and, after administering a severe beating, drove him and his *zaptiehs* from the district.' The official reported that he had been the victim of armed rebellion. In this tense situation large numbers of Kurds appeared, in the course of their seasonal migration, and stole some two hundred sheep from the Armenian herders; fighting broke out, and this time the Armenians killed several Kurds. By the middle of August, the Sultan had sent in his troops on the pretext of suppressing an Armenian rebellion.

Assisted by the *zaptiye* and Kurds, the Ottoman troops attacked and burned villages and 'wounded and killed, without regard to age or sex, all who fell into their hands.'

In a village called Semal, the Armenians, led by a priest who had received assurances from the colonel of the Turkish forces that they would be unharmed, gave themselves up. But as soon as they surrendered, the colonel gave the order to seize the priest, and then proceeded to gouge out his eyes and bayonet him to death. Then they separated the men from the women and that night raped the women. The next night they bayoneted the men to death, within hearing of the terrified women. As Consul Graves put it, things degenerated 'from bad to worse, culminating in the massacre of some three thousand Armenians in the district of Talori.' (P.55)

Miller and Miller (1993) note:

The massacres were often carried out by irregular Kurdish troops (*Hamidiye*) who had been armed by the government with sophisticated repeating rifles. They were encouraged to look for and kill Armenians, while regular Turkish troops stood by and observed. Those who perpetrated the violence at a local level were motivated by greed as much as by politics. The Sultan, however, intended the massacres to teach the Armenians a lesson that liberty and equality were not to be pursued by infidels living in within the empire. (P.38)

Word spread about the massacres in Sansun and provoked harsh opinion in Europe and America. The Sultan insisted that the Armenians were to blame for their deaths because

they had rebelled, yet an independent investigative commission set up by the British, French, and Russians found the following evidence in regards to the massacre in the Sansun region:

There was no insurrection as was reported in Constantinople; the villagers simply took up arms to defend themselves against the Kurds. The statement made to me by an official here of their having killed soldiers and Zaptiches, I found after careful inquiry to be false. Before arriving in Moush, I naturally supposed that something of the sort must have occurred to call for such a display of military force, but neither the Mutesarif nor the Military Commandant with whom I spoke on the subject hinted at anything of the sort, nor did I learn elsewhere that the Armenians had been guilty of any act of rebellion against the Government. (Balakian 2003:57; Melson 1992:45)

Now more than ever Armenians began demanding change, and with the revolution for change came bloodshed. Balakian (2003) recounts the events:

From Constantinople to Trebizond to Van to Diyarbekir, and across the whole central and eastern plain of Anatolia, where historic Armenia was lodged, the killing and plunder unfolded. One can follow the conflagration by the weeks: October 8, 1895, Trebizond Akhisar, in the district of Izmit; October 11, Gümüşhane in Trebizond Province; October 13, Bayburt in Erzurum Province; October 21, Erzinjan in Erzurum Province; October 25, Diyarbekir in Diyarbekir Province; October 28, Tomarza in Kayseri district, Ankara Province, and Urfa in Aleppo Province; October 30, Erzurum and Khnus in Erzurum Province and Moush in Bitlis Province; November 6, Arabkir in Harput Province; November 8, Tomzara in Kayseri district, Ankara Province; November 10, Gurun in Sivas Province; November 11, Harput; November 12, Sivas; November 15, Moush in Bitlis Province and Aintab in Aleppo Province; November 26, Zile in Sivas Province; November 30, Kayseri in Ankara Province; December 28-29, Urfa in Aleppo Province; January 1, 1896 Birejik in Aleppo Province. (P.59-60)

In one of the final acts of butchery by the Turkish Government, the Armenian cathedral of Urfa (ancient Edessa) was burned, with an estimated 3,000 Armenians hiding inside.⁸

⁸ Rouben Paul Adalian, “Hamidian (Armenian) Massacres” (Educational Resources-Encyclopedia Entries on the Armenian Genocide). Washington, DC: Armenian National Institute. Available on-line at: <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/hamidian.html>. Note: all works cited within this thesis of Rouben Paul Adalian, also appear in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, Israel Charny, ed., (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1999).

Christian Missionaries from the United States were witnesses to the bloodshed in the Ottoman Empire, and rallied messages back home to the American people and government to help send aid and save the Armenians from the slaughter.⁹ Balakian (2003) writes:

Week by week eyewitness accounts and survivor testimony continued to appear in the *New York Times*, the *Boston Globe*, the *San Francisco Examiner*, as well as dozens of major and small-town newspapers around the country. Accounts of children, women, and men being butchered, raped, and hacked to pieces were part of the ongoing narrative that brought home to Americans the meaning of state-sponsored massacre. (P.66)

“Many American missionaries and diplomats who worked throughout the Ottoman Empire witnessed the atrocities firsthand and helped mobilize relief efforts. Aid for Armenian victims became the first international mission of the American Red Cross” (Cohan 2005:335). For a more detailed account of the Hamidian Massacres, see, Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and Americas Response* (NY: Perennial, 2003): 53-62, 65-67, 110-115.

The Rise of the Young Turk Regime.

“As the Armenians struggled for basic rights and reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century, Turkish intellectuals were pursuing their own path to reform and political change” (Balakian 2003:135). These young intellectuals would call themselves “Young Ottomans” or “Young Turks” and their goal was to create a constitutional

⁹ There are hundreds of accounts of American Newspaper Articles rallying support for Christian Armenians and relief efforts like the organization of the National Armenian Relief Committee, for one author’s depiction of events, see, Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and Americas Response* (NY: Perennial, 2003):62-92.

government (Balakian 2003; Cohan 2005; Melson 1992). The Young Turks wanted to restore the 1876 constitution and reconvene parliament. In 1889 they “began a society they called ‘Progress and Union,’ whose aim was to overthrow the Sultan and his government” (Balakian 2003:138). There was a new rise in Nationalism and the Young Turks new Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) promised to “...create a modern state that represented inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire more equally” (Cohan 2005:335). The old empire was collapsing and the Turks externalized blame to the Armenians. According to Miller and Miller (1993) a Pan-Turkic ideology was the base for the new revolution:

In the midst of economic and structural collapse, the vision of a renewed empire was born— an empire that would unite all Turkic peoples and stretch from Constantinople to central Asia. This vision, however, excluded non-Muslim minorities, such as Armenians. (P.39)

In 1908 the CUP “rendered the Sultan powerless” (Balakian 2003; Cohan 2005; Miller and Miller 1993) and in April 1909, Cohan (2005) writes:

Hamidian supporters in the city of Adana carried out a massacre of Armenians as part of an attempt to re-establish the power of the Sultan...Despite attempts at resistance, in the end almost 30,000 Armenians were killed and nearly half the city destroyed.

The Adana Massacres garnered attention but the perpetrators were never punished, because during that same time period the CUP was making headlines with their promotion of an extreme nationalist policy of Pan-Turkism that would in effect make a “Turkey for the Turks.” (P.335)

“The Three Pashas” ran the CUP: Mehmed Talaat Pasha (Minster of the Interior), Ismail Enver Pasha (Minister of War), and Ahmed Djemal Pasha (Minister of the Navy). Though Talaat, Enver and Djemal shared the same last name, they were not biologically related. Though tensions between the Ottoman Armenians and Turkish government was

high during the next six years, no one could foresee the unimaginable atrocities the Young Turks would unleash on the Armenian people beginning in the spring of 1914. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914 the Ottoman Empire's future was once again in limbo and the government knew they could not bear to lose any more territory, especially Eastern Anatolia. Fearing that the Armenians would fight for Independence from the Ottoman Empire (with the backing of their Russian Orthodox neighbors to the East), the Empire began to strategize the systematic annihilation of the Ottoman Armenian population. The perfect opportunity arose in the fall of 1914 (August 1, 1914) when Germany declared war on Russia. The UK and France were allies with Russia at the time, and the Turks became allies with Germany, thus beginning the battle of WWI. In 1915, and under the cover of war, the Ottoman Turks began the systematic annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians.

Armenian Genocide 1915-1923.

In 1919 British officials in Turkey found a secret document outlining the CUP's plans for the Armenians, they labeled it "The Ten Commandments." Balakian (2003) describes the document as, "...a blueprint of the Armenian extermination operation and appears to have been the centerpiece of a secret party meeting, which took place sometime in late December 1914 or in January 1915." (p.189). The British labeled the document as, "DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COMITE UNION AND PROGRESS ORGANIZATION IN THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES." (Balakian 2003:189).

“The Ten Commandments” have been translated verbatim by the British and are cited in Balakian’s (2002:189-190) book as follows:

- (1). Profiting by the Arts: 3 and 4 of Comite Union and Progres, close all Armenian Societies, and arrest all who worked against Government at any time among them and send them into the provinces such as Bagdad or Mosul, and wipe them out either on the road or there.
- (2). Collect Arms
- (3). Excite Moslem opinion by suitable and special means, in places as Van, Erzeroum, Adana, where as a point of fact the Armenians have already won the hatred of the Moslems, provoke organized massacres as the Russians did at Baku.
- (4). Leave all executive to the people in provinces such as Erzeroum, Van, Mamuret ul Aziz, and Bitlis, and use Military disciplinary forces (i.e. Gendarmerie) ostensibly to stop massacres, while on the contrary in places as Adana, Sivas, Broussa, Ismidt and Smyrna actively help the Moslems with military force.
- (5). Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and children to be Islamized.
- (6). Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from all connection with their native place.
- (7). On the ground that Armenian officials may be spies, expel and drive them out absolutely from every Government department or post.
- (8). Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army—this to be left to the military to do.
- (9). All action to begin everywhere simultaneously, and thus leave no time for preparations of defensive measures.
- (10). Pay attention to the strictly confidential nature of these instructions, which may go beyond two or three persons.

The plan to exterminate the Armenians was now underway and “The Ten Commandments” described the processes of genocide in detail. The processes of genocide mentioned earlier in this thesis can be applied to the Armenian Genocide of

1915-1923 starting with the process of dehumanization. Leo Kuper (1981) mentions the dehumanization of the Ottoman Armenians in the early months of 1915:

...a curious document purporting to be the minutes of a secret meeting of the Ittihad Central Executive, held in early 1915, at which the extermination of the Armenians was planned. One of the speakers is recorded as comparing the Armenians to 'a canker, a malignance which looks like a small pimple from the outside, which, if not removed by a skilful surgeon's scalpel, will kill the patient'. Later a different type of metaphor is used, in which the alien nations left from ancient times are likened to malignant weeds, which must be plucked from the roots and cast aside. (P.91)

By linking Armenians with a deadly disease that must be cured before it killed the host body the Turkish government methodically began the process of genocide against their Armenian citizens. Armenians were literally seen as cancer living in the Ottoman Empire. By framing the Christian Armenians as a "cancer" the government mobilized the Muslim Turks for support in their plans to cleanse the Empire. The CUP wanted to create a Pan-Turkic Nation State free of non-Muslims and the only way to do so was by eradicating the Empire of the Christian Armenians (Astourian 1990; Balakian 2003; Bloxham 2003; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). It was the job of the Ottoman Turks to rid their country of the "cancer." From the beginning of the Turkish invasion into the Byzantine Empire, Christians were seen as unequal to Muslims. Yet after the CUP took over the Empire, Armenians and other Christian minorities truly believed a change in treatment would arise.

In 1915, the Turkish ruling elite proceeded to destroy the Armenian people (a population of 2 million people) by means of "massacre, deportation, rape, plunder and

murder of the most appalling kind”.¹⁰ One must remember that the Turkish government’s plan was not simply to remove the Christians but to strengthen and increase the Muslim population. Therefore, forced conversion of Armenian children and young women to Islam was another means to “eradicate the Christians” and gain more Turkish subjects (Balakian 2003; Hovannisian 1992; Kuper 1981; Melson 1992; Papazian 1987). Even though Armenians had a long record of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, Turks assumed they would disregard their allegiances in search of Independence. The Ottoman Turks used this as a pretext to deal with the entire Armenian population as an enemy within their empire (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Under the hysteria, Turkey soon began the deportation and murder of the Armenian cultural elite.

Fein (1979) notes that before Armenians were to be deported their means of protection was removed. The civilian population was disarmed and segregated by sex. The next step was disarming the Armenians in the Ottoman Army so that they could not aid the civilian population. “Armenian men in the army were segregated into special units (‘labor battalions’), disarmed, and later slain” (Fein 1979:15).

Melson (1992:143-144) adds:

Armenian troops serving with the Ottoman forces were disarmed, demobilized, and grouped into labor battalions. Concurrently, the Armenians civilian population was also disarmed, with each community required to produce a specified number of weapons. The search for weapons became an occasion for destroying the local leadership; when community leaders were unable to produce the officially required number, they were arrested for secretly stashing arms; when they did come up with the required number, they were arrested for conspiring against the government.

¹⁰ Quote taken from Peter Balakian in *The Armenian Genocide* documentary, produced by: Two Cats Productions.

Miller and Miller (1993) reiterate Melson's claims:

...Turkish officials demanded that all guns and weapons owned by Armenians be brought to government offices and relinquished. In some instances, specific quotas were given, and Armenians had to buy weapons if they did not own enough within their community. (P.67)

The plan to destroy the Armenian Population began on April 24th 1915 with a plan to destroy the Armenian cultural elite. "...Some 1,000 prominent Armenians were arrested in the capital and secretly murdered, leaving the others numbed by terror" (Fein 1979:15). Teachers, doctors, lawyers were all rounded up and never came back. If Armenians had any chance of saving themselves they lost it when they were hit with the final blow from the Turkish government: "The remaining males in each village were summoned by the town crier to report immediately, led out of town, and slain" (Fein 1979:15). With no guidance from their intellectual leaders or support from their able bodied men, the remaining Armenians – women, children, elderly and those with illnesses – were left to fend for themselves.

After the murders on April 24th, the Turkish government rounded up the civilian populations and either murdered, or deported them into the Syrian Desert (Balakian 2003; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Fein 1979; Kuper 1981; Melson 1992; Papazian 1987; Power 2002; Rubenstein and Roth 2003). Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) describe the round up:

...in May, Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha, claiming that the Armenians were untrustworthy, that they could offer aid and comfort to the enemy, and that they were in a state of imminent nationwide rebellion, ordered their deportation from the war zones to relocation centers – actually the deserts of Syria and Mesopotamia. In fact the Armenians were driven out not only from the war zones but from the width and breadth of the Empire, with the exception of Constantinople and Smyrna, where there were many foreign diplomats and merchants. (P.260)

The deportations of the Armenians in 1915 from the provinces in the east, into the Syrian Desert at Aleppo in the south, led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Armenians (Astourian 1990; Balakian 2003; Bloxham 2003; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Dadrian 1986; Kuper 1981; Melson 1992; Papazian 1987; Power 2002; Rubenstein and Roth 2003). Charny (1982) notes that not all Armenians were deported (at least not immediately):

Since the Turks of the interior were almost totally unskilled, a representative Armenian craftsman in each area – a shoemaker, a tailor, a pharmacist – was permitted to remain...In the first six months alone, over 1,200,000 people joined this unearthly procession. (P.7)

Regarding the deportations during the Armenian Genocide, historian Arnold Toynbee is cited as saying:

In Turkey... in 1915... the deportations were deliberately conducted with a brutality that was calculated to take the maximum toll of lives *en route*. This was the CUP's crime; and my study of it left an impression on my mind that was not effaced by the still more cold-blooded genocide, on a far larger scale, that was committed during the Second World War by the Nazis. (Kuper 1981:141)

Miller and Miller (1993) describe the deportations as such:

Most Armenians were given a period of a week or two to prepare for their deportation journey, although in some instances they had only a few days. Believing it to be an actual deportation (as opposed to extermination), those with financial means hired carts, donkeys, or mules to carry their possessions. The wealthier a family was, the more carts or animals it could afford. In fact, some families actually contracted with Turks to provide their transportation. Poor families, however, took only what they could carry, which was very little, since many of them had infants and children who needed to be cared for. In a few areas, such as Konia, deportees were transported by train in extremely crowded, wagonlike cars. (P.79)

Balakian (2003) summarizes the deportations via railway:

...The century's first genocide began in part in the cattle cars of the Anatolian and the Baghdad Railway. In many cities and towns part of the Armenian population was piled into freight cars – around ninety in a car that 'had a

standard capacity for the military transport of 36 men or 6 horses.’ Crammed behind slatted bars, they were starving, in terror and defecating on themselves. Most of the rail cars went south and east, most often to the city of Konia, where the deportees were often let out to continue on foot before they were robbed, raped, and murdered, by the killing squads. Sometimes they were shipped all the way through to Aleppo, where those who survived arrived emaciated and near death, only to confront more massacre. (P.191)

Balakian (2003) goes on to write:

In order to extort as much money as possible from the Armenians, the Turkish authorities often forced them to pay first-class fare before they put them into the cattle cars that would most likely take them to their deaths. On September 8, 1915, Dr. William S. Dodd wrote: ‘The exiles were compelled to pay the full fare and then packed forty or fifty together in box-trucks, cattle trucks, or even open flat trucks. The Railway seems to be as conscienceless in wringing the money out of them as the Government or the Turks.’ (P.195)

The CUP set up the “Special Organization,” to take care of the deportations and ensuing massacres (Melson 1992:145). Melson (1992) notes:

For the purposes of the deportations and mass killings, the Special Organization formed cadres from among convicted criminals who were released for their duties by the Ministries of Interior and Justice. A captain in the Ottoman War Office’s Intelligence Department noted after the war:

The criminal gangs who were released from the prisons, after a week’s training at the War College’s training grounds, were sent off to the Caucasian front as the brigands of the Special Organization, perpetrating the worst crimes against the Armenians. The Ittihadists intended to destroy the Armenians, and thereby to do away with the Question of the Eastern Provinces. (P.145)

During the years of 1915-1918, the Armenian people were subjected to deportation, expropriation, abduction, torture, massacre and starvation (Miller and Miller 1993). Armenians were sent into the barren desert without protection from the physical elements or the Special Organization’s attacks on the defenseless caravans. “Realizing that security might be a problem, deportees often attempted to conceal money by sewing it into their clothes or hiding it among their possessions” (Miller and Miller 1993:80).

“Realizing that the Consulate was the safest place to leave money and valuables, still others deposited it with Leslie Davis¹¹, and his quarters soon became what he called ‘a safe deposit vault for the Armenians’” (Balakian 2003:236). Balakian (2003) goes on to write:

It was ‘pathetic,’ Davis recalled, ‘to see the people bringing their money, their jewels, their valuable documents, and articles of all kinds to the Consulate and to the missionaries, asking us to keep them.’ (P.236)

While on the marches through the desert the victims in the caravan were denied food and water by the Turkish gendarmes “assigned to protect them” (Balakian 2003; Miller and Miller 1993). Miller and Miller (1993) cite survivor testimony from the Genocide and they make the following statement in regards to the deportation:

Repeatedly survivors said that the gendarmes prohibited the caravans from drinking, even when they were near water sources. We can only speculate that there must have been an official policy of killing Armenians through dehydration; it is difficult otherwise to imagine denying a child a cup of water. (P.85)

Balakian (2003) summarizes the victim’s experiences during the caravan marches by stating:

Davis learned that because the Muslims considered ‘the clothes taken from a dead body to be defiled,’ all the Armenians were forced to strip before being killed, and Davis describes ‘gaping bayonet wounds on most of the bodies.’ Because bullets were so precious, it was ‘cheaper to kill with bayonets and knives.’ Davis was also shocked to find that, as he put it, ‘nearly all of the women lay flat on their backs and showed signs of barbarous mutilation by bayonets of the gendarmes, these wounds having been inflicted in many cases probably after the women were dead.’ The bodies, they learned, were of Armenians who had been marched there from distant places. In other parts of Turkey, the same methods of massacre by butchery were occurring because the Turks didn’t want to waste ammunition. In Ankara and its surroundings, only a couple of hundred miles east of Constantinople, the killing was done with ‘axes, cleavers, shovels, and pitchforks,’ Krikoris Balakian wrote. It was like a

¹¹ Leslie Davis was the U.S. Consul to Harput in 1914.

slaughterhouse; Armenians were hacked to pieces, and the killing squads mixed with townspeople ‘dashed infants on the rocks’ before the eyes of their mothers. The carnage around Ankara was so horrible that Talaat Pasha ordered more than forty thousand corpses to be quickly buried in mass graves, but the stench of death and the mounds of bodies overwhelmed the landscape. (P.245)

Leo Kuper (1981) writes about the death marches and disposal of Armenian bodies when he cites a “record of an interview with an Armenian physician,” which was originally documented in *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916*:

I asked my gendarmes what all the strange little mounds of earth were which I saw everywhere, with thousands of dogs prowling round about them. ‘Those are the graves of the infidels!’ they answer calmly. ‘Strange, so many graves for such a little village.’ ‘Oh, you do not understand. Those are the graves of these dogs – those who were brought here first, last August. They all died of thirst.’ ‘Of thirst? Was there no water left in the Euphrates?’ ‘For whole weeks together we were forbidden to let them drink.’ (P.101)

Without food or water Armenians marched on; more often than not they had to leave their dead or dying family and friends behind. Even children were left behind on the marches; their own family members drowned some in order to save them from the brutality of the Turks and Kurds (Balakian 2003; Melson 1992; Miller and Miller 1993).

One survivor of the Genocide recalls how her parents left her eight-year old brother behind during the deportation:

‘Leave me here. I can’t go on.’ He said that his legs were bleeding from rubbing against each other. But how can a mother leave the child? My father said, ‘Leave him. We will be left behind, too. We will all be left. Armenian woman, leave him.’ Now my parents were arguing. My mother can’t part from him. Finally, they left him, sat him down, and left some food with him. But no water. We walked on, but my mother kept looking back to the child and kept crying. But my father kept saying, ‘Walk, woman. We will each stay behind too, one by one. We must. This is our fate.’ (Miller and Miller 1993:99)

I read on an Armenian Genocide commemoration poster once, “In 1915 there were no concentration camps, there was only the Syrian Desert.” Henry Morgenthau

(American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1916) has been quoted as saying:

I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915. (The Armenian Assembly of America 1988; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:261)

Talaat once tried to justify his reasons behind the indiscriminate slaughter of the Armenians to Henry Morgenthau, claiming:

We have been reproached for making no distinction between innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible in view of the fact that those who were innocent today might be guilty tomorrow. (Melson 1992:168-169)

On another occasion Talaat attempted to extort money from deceased Armenians via American Life insurance policies (Melson 1992; Power 2002). Melson (1992) cites Morgenthau's recollection of the event:

One day Talaat made what was perhaps the most astonishing request I had ever heard. The New York Life Insurance Company and the Equitable Life of New York had for years done considerable business among the Armenians. 'I wish,' Talaat now said, 'that you would get the American life insurance companies to send us a complete list of the Armenian Policy holders. They are practically all dead now and have left no heirs to collect the money. It of course escheats the State. The Government is the beneficiary now. Will you do so?' (P.169)

Morgenthau refused, and in August of 1915 he sent word to Washington notifying the U.S. government of Turkey's "attempt to exterminate a race" (Bass 2006). In September of 1915, "the CUP devised legal as well as purely coercive and violent means of stealing, plundering and appropriating Armenian moveable and immovable wealth" by enacting the "Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation" without the help of Morgenthau (Balakian 2003:187). According to Balakian (2003) "The law was allegedly designed to register the properties of the deportees, safeguard them, dispose of them at public

auctions, with the revenues to be held in trust until the deportees' return" (p.187). Ahmed

Riza was the only senator to protest the law claiming:

It is unlawful to designate the Armenian assets and properties as "abandoned goods," for the Armenians, the proprietors, did not abandon their properties voluntarily; they were forcibly, compulsively removed from their domiciles and exiled. Now the government through its officials is selling their goods... Nobody can sell my property if I am unwilling to sell it. Article 21 of the Constitution forbids it. If we are a constitutional regime functioning in accordance with constitutional law we can't do this. This is atrocious. Grab my arm, eject me from my village, then sell my goods and properties, such a thing can never be permissible. Neither the conscience of the Ottomans nor the law can allow it. (Balakian 2003:188)

Unfortunately the Ottoman government did allow it and the Turkish Ottomans and their successors (Turks living in present day Turkey) have benefited from it.

International Awareness.

Americans were aware of the crimes against the Armenians because U.S. media coverage was overflowing with stories depicting the Armenians plight. "...during the genocide, a society known as the Near East Relief would raise more than \$100 million in assistance to the Armenians" (Cohan 2005:355). The Armenian Assembly of America (1988) exclaims:

The American print media devoted extensive coverage to the fate of the Armenian people during the Turkish Atrocities. In the *New York Times* alone, over 194 news articles appeared.

The brochure has a chronological sampling of the news headlines, here are a few:

"Appeal to Turks to Stop Massacres" printed in *New York Times* on April 28, 1915;

"Armenians Sent to Desert to Perish" printed in *New York Times* on August 27, 1915;

"800,000 Armenians Counted Destroyed" printed in *New York Times* on October 7,

1915; “Aid from Armenians Blocked by Turkey” printed in New York Times on November 1, 1915; “Million Armenians Killed or in Exile” printed in New York Times on December 15, 1915; and “Armenia’s Tragic Finish” printed in Literary Digest on February 25, 1922.

Not once did the United States intervene on behalf of the Armenians with a threat of military force. Even when the U.S. entered the war to fight Germany in April 1917, President Wilson “refused to declare war on or even break off relations with the Ottoman Empire” and “In the end it was Turkey that broke off ties with the United States” (Power 2002:13). Power (2002) writes:

America’s nonresponse to the Turkish horrors established patterns that would be repeated. Time and again the U.S. government would be reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and formally denounce a fellow state for its atrocities. Time and again though U.S. officials would learn that huge numbers of civilians were being slaughtered, the impact of this knowledge would be blunted by their uncertainty about the facts and their rationalization that a firmer U.S. stand would make little difference. Time and again American assumptions and policies would be contested by Americans in the field closest to the slaughter, who would try to stir the imaginations of their political superiors. And time and again these advocates would fail to sway Washington. The United States would offer humanitarian aid to the survivors of ‘race murder’ but would leave those committing it alone. (P.13-14)

“After the defeat of the Turks in October 1918, the widely publicized plight of the “Starving Armenians” brought millions of dollars in aid, as well as relief workers and medical personnel, to Turkey from the United States and Europe” (Miller and Miller 1993:15).

At the end of WWI Britain, France and Russia, “...began planning the century’s first international war crimes tribunal” for Germany, Austria and Turkey (Power 2002:14). The British still had 320,000 soldiers in Turkey in 1919 and “pressured the

cooperative Sultan to arrest a number of Turkish executioners” (Power 2002:14). The 1920 Treaty of Sevres called for punishment of the perpetrators, but the new Turkish Nationalist party, headed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk “undermined the entire process” (Dadrian 1986; Melson 1992:149). Talaat, Enver and Djemal fled from Constantinople to Germany in late 1918. The Military Court in Turkey found all three men guilty and convicted them to death in absentia (Balakian 2003; Melson 1992; Power 2002). The court ruled:

The disaster visiting the Armenians was not a local or isolated event. It was the result of a premeditated decision taken by the central body; ...and the immolations and excess which took place were based on oral and written orders issued by that central body” (Power 2002:15).

The ruling of the courts did not really accomplish what the authors of the Treaty desired. Germany refused to extradite the Pashas to Turkey, and Atatürk’s party slipped right into power without holding any of the perpetrators guilty. A young Armenian named Soghomon Tehlirian eventually assassinated Talaat in Germany in 1921. Tehlirian was the only member of his family to survive the genocide and took Talaat’s life in their name (Power 2002). A German court found Tehlirian not guilty basically by reason of temporary insanity (Power 2002). In 1922 an Armenian named Stepan Dzaghigian assassinated Djemal for his role in the genocide and Enver was killed shortly after in a bombing. Even with the trial of the perpetrators, there have never been any measures to ensure Armenians receive restitution from the Ottoman Turkish Empire’s successor, present day Turkey. Justice has not been served.

During the years of 1920-1923, tens of thousands more Armenians were massacred by Atatürk’s new ruling party (Miller and Miller 1993). This new party,

though opposed to the Young Turks, shared a common ideology of ethnic exclusivity. They too wanted a purely Muslim-Turkish state and were not above the slaughter of innocent people to accomplish their goal. "By the end of 1923, the entire Armenian population of Anatolia and Western Armenia had been either killed or deported" (The Armenian Assembly of America 1988). Balakian (2003) claims, "In the end between half and two-thirds of the more than two million Armenians living on their historic homeland in the Ottoman Empire were annihilated" (p.195). "Some historians put the figure at about 1.5 million, which spans the period from 1915 to 1922, when the last waves of killing took place" (Balakian 2003:196). Talaat Pasha once boasted, "I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years!" (Power 2002:8).

Life After the Armenian Genocide

After the end of WWI in 1918, Armenians traveled back to their homeland only to find their homes either destroyed or inhabited by Turks who felt it was their right to live in these homes because Armenians, after all, were the ones who left them behind (Miller and Miller 1993). As noted earlier, in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the Ottoman Empire ceded a small part of the traditional Armenian homeland to the Russian Empire, known as Eastern Armenia, while Western Armenia remained under Ottoman Sovereignty. Between 1918-1920 Eastern Armenia enjoyed "self-rule" as an Independent Nation, but then the small Republic was annexed to Russia and became the Soviet Republic of Armenia (The Armenian Assembly of America 1988). After a long struggle Armenia

finally gained Independence in 1991. In April of 1993, the common border between Turkey and Armenia was closed, diplomatic relations were broken off and propaganda warfare was commenced.

Before the Holocaust, the Armenian massacres between 1915-1923 were considered the worst crime against humanity and the first major genocide of the twentieth century. Today the crime is simply considered the “forgotten genocide” (Kuper 1981:105). Miller and Miller (1993) note before the Genocide of 1915, more than 2 million Armenians lived in Turkey, and now there are less than 100,000 Armenians living there, with the majority of the citizens concentrated mainly in Istanbul. The CUP began the process of genocide on their Armenian population 92 years ago, yet their successors have been perpetuating the final phase of “denial” for the past 84 years. It seems the current State of Turkey has not only inherited the Ottoman Empire’s land but also their legacy to the genocide. Hovannisian (1992) wrote:

In the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide, the survivors barred from returning home, scattered around the world, while the perpetrator regime and all successive Turkish governments engaged in unrelenting campaigns of denial and rationalization.

The Armenian Genocide set precedent and was a blue print for the Nazi’s. On August 22, 1939 one week before Adolf Hitler gave orders to invade Poland, he addressed his military commanders with orders to, “Kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language” (www.theforgotten.org). He concludes his remarks

by saying, “ Who, after all speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”

(Bardakjian 1985:1; Miller and Miller 1993:5).¹²

Brief History of Jewish Holocaust

The word *Holocaust* is synonymous with the name *Adolf Hitler*. Though Hitler was the mastermind behind the Holocaust and did implement the authorization of the actual events, he was not the sole perpetrator of the Holocaust. To blame one person would be simple but to show that such calculation and hate exists on a much larger spectrum is the key to truly analyzing genocide in general, and the Holocaust in particular. Due to the processes of dehumanization and socialization, people truly believed Jews were a threat and therefore the justification of annihilating them was a much easier task to overcome (Browning 1998; Gross 2002; Melson 1992). Since Christians were socialized from the start to believe Jews were “evil” and only out to destroy Christianity (i.e. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*) it was much easier for governments such as France, Poland, Russia, and Germany to discriminate and persecute Jews through overtly racist laws and sanctions (Rubenstein and Roth 2003). The citizens of each of these Nations were in fact involved in the killing of more than six million Jews during 1933-1945, if not because they physically took part in the killings, then due to the fact that NO ONE intervened to stop it. Nations like the United States, Russia, and even the Vatican did not allow Jews who were able to flee persecution onto their land (Rubenstein and Roth 2003). Once again the bystander phenomenon comes into play, and

¹² Hitler’s speech has been cited by several other authors including: Balakian 2003:165; Power 2002:23.

by turning a blind eye these states contributed to the deaths of two-thirds of the Central European Jewish population (Rubenstein and Roth 2003).

Just as the Genocide was considered the “Answer” to the “Armenian Question,” the Holocaust was considered the “Final Solution” to the “Jewish Question.” Rubenstein and Roth (2003) claim:

World War II claimed the lives of fifty million people, more than half of them civilians. Operating largely under the cover of war, the Third Reich’s system of concentration camps, murder squadrons, and killing centers took millions of defenseless human lives, between five and six million Jews among them. As we understand the Holocaust, it was the systematic, state-organized persecution and murder of approximately six million Jews by Nazi Germany and its collaborators. (P.2)

The Genocide and Holocaust have many similarities; a few obvious parallels between the two crimes are that they were both committed under the deep cover of World Wars; Pasha and Hitler used tactics of dehumanization and similar means of routinization in their genocides; members of the civilian population aided in the round up and actual murder of the Armenians and Jews respectively; and both the CUP and the Nazi regime attempted to cover up their crimes through denial propaganda. In Hovannisian’s (1992) seminal research on instances of Altruism during the Genocide, he lists the “striking similarities” between the Holocaust and Genocide:

- Perpetuation of genocide under the cover of an international war, thus minimizing the possibility of foreign intervention.
- Conception of the plan by a monolithic and xenophobic clique.
- Espousal of an ideology giving purpose and justification to exclusivism and intolerance toward elements resisting or deemed unworthy of assimilation.
- Imposition of strict party discipline and secrecy during the period of preparation.
- Formation of extralegal special armed forces to ensure rigorous execution of the operation.
- Provocation of public hostility toward the victim group and ascription to it of the very excesses to which it would be subjected.

- Certainty of the vulnerability of the targeted group, as demonstrated in the Armenians case by the previous massacres of 1894-1896 and 1909.
- Exploitation of advances in mechanization and communication to achieve unprecedented means for control, coordination, and thoroughness.
- Use of positive and negative sanctions, such as promotions and incentive to loot or, conversely, dismissal and punishment of recalcitrant officials and intimidation of persons who might be inclined to harbor members of the victim group.

Both the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust fall under Chalk and Jonassohn's (1990) fourth "typology of genocide according to the perpetrator's motive."¹³ Both genocides were based on an ideology of superiority vs. inferiority. Chalk and Jonassohn's fourth typology is a genocide based on the perpetrator's motive to "implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology" (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:29). In the case of the Armenians, Turks believed Armenians were inferior because of their religious beliefs and could be saved if "converted to Islam." Jews on the other hand did not have the opportunity to "change" for salvation's sake because the Nazi's felt their *race* was inferior. Kuper (1981) notes:

The German definition of Jews in terms of ancestry excluded the possibility of escape through conversion, as had been sometimes possible in Turkey, and death was visited on all, men, women and children. (P.124)

Hitler also mentions the Armenians in another statement, this time dehumanizing them by discussing the racial inferiority of Armenians and Jews in comparison with Aryan Germans:

Considering that only a pure consciousness of racism can ensure the survival of our race, we were constrained to introduce racial legislation in such a clear way that such legislation could eliminate all alien racial infection, and this infection is

¹³ The Armenian Genocide also falls under Chalk and Jonassohn's (1990) third typology of genocide according to the perpetrator's motive, "to acquire economic wealth." Turks wanted to secure their Pan-Turkic Empire by eliminating Christians and yet keep control of their (Armenian) homeland in Eastern Anatolia.

not caused only by Jews. In enlightening the German people with regard to this racial legislation, we should conceive of it as having the task of protecting the German blood from contamination, not only of the Jewish but also of the Armenian blood. (Bardakjian 1985:30)

Just as the Turks wanted a Pan-Turkic Nation free of all non-Muslims, the Nazi's wanted Europe (the world for that matter) cleansed of all non-Aryans. The Jews were not only blamed for "killing Christ" but also for the lack of jobs in Central Europe. The fact that Eastern Jews were being pushed out of their countries and forced to find work in populations where Christians were the majority did not help the matter (Rubenstein and Roth 2003). Jews were in fact competing with Christians for jobs. Some would assume that large populations of Jews were in fact "taking" jobs from Christians but in reality Jews were doing the same jobs they had been trained to do for centuries. Jews were originally forced into occupations such as "finance" because Christians considered any work that entailed usury defiling/corrupt. Therefore, when times got tough it was the Christians that began taking over Jewish trades (i.e. finance, law, medicine, etc.) (Rubenstein and Roth 2003). The Jews were the biggest threat to this Nazi ideology and the Third Reich played on Christian rhetoric – which falsely claims that Jews killed Christ – in order to rally support for their cause to exterminate the Jews.

Just as the Turks dehumanized the Armenians by associating the group with "cancer," the Nazi's framed Jews as "rats" and "vermin" that were taking over and needed to be exterminated (Rubenstein and Roth 2003). "The murderers were determined to take away their victims' dignity before they took their lives" (Browning 1998:61). The dehumanization process did not just end with name-calling. The Nazi's made sure to show their superiority over the Jews by first placing them in inhuman living conditions

called ghettos. Oliner (2000) describes his experience in the Bobowa ghetto (one of the many ghetto's set up for Jewish imprisonment):

The young and old, the healthy and sick were all thrown together. Garbage and human waste piled up faster than it could be disposed of. Lice infested everything. Children walked naked through the cold damp alleys. Typhoid was common, as were diarrhea and dysentery. Jews who had once owned property and small businesses now dressed in rags. Elderly people, sickly and weak, used the sides of buildings for support as they shuffled down the streets. The most prevalent sickness of all was fear. What would the Nazis do next? What was going to happen? (P.80)

Like the Turks before them, the Nazi's used trains to deport their victims – to concentration camps – and even charged Jews fare for their passage to the death camps (Balakian 2003; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Rubenstein and Roth 2003). Imagine eighty people crammed into a cattle car with maybe “a few loaves of bread and some buckets of water” (Wiesel 1960:20).

When the trains finally made it to their destinations (sometimes several days after departure), the victims were immediately separated into groups of men and women and then further split into more groups based on age and health (Rubenstein and Roth 2003; Wiesel 1960). In the end the victims were placed into two groups, those heading to the crematorium and those heading to the concentration camp. In Elie Wiesel's (1960) book *Night*, he tells the true story of his family's death and his survival at the Nazi death camp in Auschwitz. He and his father were immediately separated from his mother and sisters, and as they walked towards the work camp entrance they were forced to walk past the ditches where Jews (men, women and children) were being shot and burned (Wiesel 1960). It was the first time Wiesel had seen his father cry, he wrote:

Around us, everyone was weeping. Someone began to recite the Kaddish, the prayer for the dead. I do not know if it has ever happened before, in the long history of the Jews, that people have ever recited the prayer for the dead for themselves. (P.31)

While in the camps, Heger (1980) notes that prisoners were segregated even further:

The prisoners' uniforms were marked with a colored cloth triangle to denote their offense or origin. Their prison number was sown below the triangle. The triangle was about five centimeters across and placed down, and was stitched onto the left breast of the jacket and coat and the outside right trouser leg. The colors of the triangles were as follows: yellow for Jews, red for politicals, green for criminals, pink for homosexuals, black for anti-socials, purple for Jehovah's Witnesses, blue for emigrants, and brown for Gypsies. The Pink Triangle, however, was about 2 or 3 centimeters larger than the others...." (P.31-32)

As winter 1944 rolled around the Allied armies were closing in and the Nazis knew the end was near. In an attempt to abandon the concentration camps and hide evidence of their crimes, the Nazis burned documents and physically uprooted the already malnourished and weak prisoners for yet another journey to a concentration camp away from the front lines (Rubenstein and Roth 2003; Wiesel 1960). These convoys are what is known as the "death marches." Like the Armenians before them, Holocaust victims were not allowed to fall behind or rest in fear of being shot on the spot or left behind in the unbearable conditions to die a slow and painful death. The victims of the Holocaust were finally liberated in the late summer of 1944. The Soviets were the first to liberate the concentration camps, while the British and American forces followed close behind. And like the victims of the first Genocide of the twentieth century, those who survived the Holocaust did not receive support from the United States Government until it was too late.

History has shown that during times of genocide, the world remains silent. Lack of response and no real deterrence to such horrendous crimes only perpetrates the act of genocide further. If we have learned anything from the various genocide scholars' typologies and explanations of genocide, it is that genocide does not happen overnight. After the Armenian Genocide, precedent has been set and though each case of genocide may be unique in its own way, the scholarship on genocide tells us that the majority of genocides: (1) *can be classified according to the perpetrator's motive* (i.e. to eliminate a real or potential threat; to spread terror among real or potential enemies; to acquire economic wealth; or to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology); (2) *are made up of four groups of people* (i.e. Killers, Victims, Rescuers, and Bystanders); and (3) *will follow the five-basic/typical processes of genocide* (i.e. Dehumanization of Victims, Authorization of mass-murder, Routinization, Murder and Denial).

The Holocaust was surely not the last genocide of the twentieth century, in fact several followed suit. One particular case of genocide that shares striking similarities to the Holocaust and the Genocide before it is the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Power (2001) summarizes the Rwandan Genocide:

In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in exterminating the country's Tutsi minority. Using firearms, machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. (P.1)

In all three genocides, the massacres were planned and authorized by the ruling government, and ideological propaganda was used to rally support from the potential killers.

In the case of Rwanda, ideological propaganda was definitely used by the government to rally support from Hutu. Fearing that the Tutsis (the numerical minority) were trying to take control of the government, the Hutu committed the unthinkable – they literally hacked their neighbors to death (Power 2001). After the initial killings of the Tutsis, the Tutsi Rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front counter-attacked the Hutu. The *civil war* commenced, yet the Hutu were being backed with the military power of the government, while the Tutsi only had the Rebel fighters (Power 2001). In all three of these genocides (Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan), civilians were closely linked to the murders and therefore the use of *civil war* rhetoric as a defense seemed logical (at least in the case of the Armenian Genocide and Rwanda).

Just as in the victims of the Holocaust and Genocide before it had done, the victims of the Rwandan Genocide reached out for help, and as with the previous cases the victims' pleas for recognition/ aid fell on deaf ears. Once again, the world stood by and allowed a community to be destroyed. No one wanted to help the Rwandans for fear of “another Somalia” (Power 2001), and so for three months we all quietly watched as the already outrageously high number of dead soared higher and higher each day. The key comparison in all three of these genocides is the lack of recognition each one was given while the systematic annihilation of a race raged on.

It was not my intention in this chapter to give a detailed account of the Holocaust or the genocide in Rwanda – as the Armenian Genocide is the main case study – I instead mentioned the similarities to the Armenian Genocide in an effort to show the considerable role it had in future genocides. The basic similarities between the three

genocides are quite evident; all three genocides began with dehumanization of the victim group, authorization from an authority, routinization (various methods of murder throughout each genocide), and proceeded to the final process of “denial.” However it is only in the case of the Armenian Genocide that the process of denial has raged on for nearly a century.

In the case of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish government seeks to repress the history of the 1915-1923 deportations and massacres of the Ottoman Armenian people. While the UN has officially recognized the Holocaust and Rwandan Genocide, and the perpetrators have acknowledged (and even given apologies/ reparations for) their crimes, the UN has chosen to not taken a stand against Turkey’s continued denial of the Armenian Genocide. Furthermore, even after numerous Countries/Parliaments around the world have recognized the Armenian Genocide¹⁴, and 40 of the 50 States in America have officially recognized the Genocide¹⁵, the U.S. Federal Government continues to deny an “official recognition.” Denial is an important part of the processes of genocide because of the long lasting effects it has on the survivors and decedents of survivors. Since the denial of the Armenian Genocide is a historically rooted issue, it is important to analyze both Turkey and the United States’ policies of denial.

¹⁴ Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Vatican City, and Venezuela have all officially recognized the Armenian Genocide.

¹⁵ According to the Armenian National Committee of America (2007d) as of May 2007, the following States have officially recognized the Armenian Genocide: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

CHAPTER 4: POLICY OF DENIAL

In the Armenian case, more than anything else it is the trauma that is especially enduring because of the refusal of the perpetrator regime or its successors to acknowledge the crime and to seek redemption. Instead of apologies and educational programs to face their history and themselves honestly, the Turkish government and most Turkish intellectuals continue along a path of self-righteous negation. In this dissimulation they are joined by sympathetic academics abroad, thereby only compounding the trauma of the victims. (Hovannisian 2001:1).

Denial is the final stage in the processes of genocide and as noted in Chapter Two, Armenian's sense of identity has been shaped by the trauma and collective memories surrounding the Armenian Genocide. Armenians have united over the trauma and, because of the denial, have continued to rally around the Armenian Cause. Hovannisian (2001) notes the silence around recognition of the Genocide when he states, "Denial of the Armenian Genocide has become fully institutionalized..." (p.2). According to Hovannisian (2001):

Deniers and rationalizers of the Armenian Genocide use the following arguments, many of which will be recognized by students of other mass killings:

1. Stories about alleged genocide are based on wartime propaganda;
2. Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were perceived as posing a very real security threat, and their actions demonstrated that these concerns were not imaginary;
3. There was no intent to annihilate the group, only to relocate it;
4. The Armenian deaths that occurred were primarily from the same causes that carried away far more Turks and Kurds;
5. The number of dead is much less than claimed, and most of the alleged victims actually ended up in other countries;
6. The myth of genocide was created for economic and/or political purposes;
7. Those who believe and promote the myth have been willful or unwitting abettors of communism and Soviet expansion and the destabilization of the NATO alliance and the West;
8. The proponents of truth are struggling against powerful political lobbies to rectify negative stereotypes and historical misconceptions.

The use of such rhetoric mentioned by Hovannisian and other genocide scholars has kept the denial of the Armenian Genocide alive for 92 years and counting.

The voice behind the Armenian Genocide denial is the Ottoman Empire's successor state, present day Turkey.

Turkey's Official Response to Armenian Genocide

Just as Armenians sense of identity is wrapped around the memories of genocide, Turkish National identity is central in denial of this crime. In Turkey it is literally against the law to acknowledge the Genocide or infer that Turkey is to blame for the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians during WWI. On June 1, 2005, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) was enacted to criminalize critical opinions of Turkey (Amnesty International 2005). According to Amnesty International (2005), Article 301 states:

1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years.
2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security structures shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years.
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third.
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.

Mentioning the Genocide is considered "Denigration of Turkishness," also referred to as "Insulting Turkishness," and since it was enacted several people have been charged and tried under the law. One man who has been charged with "Insulting Turkishness" is Nobel Prize for Literature winner Orhan Pamuk. Even though charges were eventually dropped, Mr. Pamuk was charged under Article 301 for saying that "1 million

Armenians” were killed during WWI. Another person brought to trial for “Insulting Turkishness” and actually given a six-month suspended sentence was Armenian-Turkish Journalist Hrant Dink of *Agos* Newspaper (Armenian National Committee of America 2007a). Mr. Dink was assassinated on January 19th of this year while leaving his newspaper’s office in Turkey. He was an outspoken advocate of the Armenian Cause and had been threatened numerous times for his recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Turkey is currently trying to enter the democratic European Union (EU), yet several Nations including France and the UK have blocked nominations for Turkey’s entrance into the Union in large part because of Turkey’s continued denial of the Genocide, and current treatment of minorities living in Turkey (i.e. non-Muslims).

Turkish Historian Taner Akçam has said:

Without facing its history, without coming to terms with the past, Turkey cannot be a member of European Union. The expectation from Turkey is that it faces the historic wrongdoings and acknowledges its moral responsibility. There are at least six to seven different resolutions of European Parliament asking Turkey to acknowledge the genocide (Wilson 2006).

Article 301 has definitely not helped Turkey’s bid for a spot in the democratic EU, mainly because censorship of thoughts and ideas have no place in a democracy. The law is seemingly a legalized form of forced Nationalism, and Frey (2006) states:

Turkish nationalism may be the biggest obstacle to E.U. membership, more so than religion or its comparatively low-income levels. There is no way that Turkey will ever join the E.U. if it continues to prosecute its brightest minds for demanding historical honesty.

The Turkish government has not only enacted measures to censor discussion of Armenian genocide within their own borders, but they have also taken steps to silence the international community at large. For instance, the Jerusalem based Institute on

Holocaust and Genocide has faced pressure from Turkey after "...evaluations of primary and secondary sources of eye-witness reports of forced marches and executions of Armenians, and state directives organizing a campaign to rid Turkey of 'the Armenian problem'..." led them to assert the "...basic historical authenticity of the genocide of the Armenians" (Charny and Fromer 1998:41). Charny and Fromer (1998) cite a statement made by The Institute on Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem to describe how the Turkish government has targeted the Institute:

In the course of organizing an international scholarly conference on the Holocaust and genocide in Tel Aviv in 1982, the Institute was the direct object of powerful pressures originating from the Turkish government to suppress and banish any examination, clarification or discussion of the Armenian genocide, and was witness to the fact that these pressures were delivered not only in conventional political pressures but also included reprehensible threats of dangers of actual loss of life to certain Jews in a hostage situation. (P.42)

Hovannisian (2001) gives another example of the Turkish government's attempt to silence discussion of the Armenian Genocide outside of Turkey:

...in the 1930s when Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios bought the film rights to the celebrated novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, depicting the struggle for survival of several Armenian villages near the Mediterranean Sea, the Turkish government protested to the Department of State, which interceded with the Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors of America to have MGM shelve the project. Quiet diplomatic and economic pressures were sufficient to keep the film from the American and World public. (P.20)

As mentioned earlier, several Countries/Parliaments have recognized the Armenian Genocide, but in both France and Switzerland it is also against the law to deny that the deportations and mass killings of Armenians in Turkey during WWI amounted to "genocide." The current Republic of Turkey not only condemns countries that recognize the Armenian Genocide, but has severed ties with countries like France because of their

legislation regarding “denial.” “The Turkish military cut all contacts with the French military and terminated defense contracts under negotiation” (Bush Presses Congress to Block Armenian Genocide Bill 2007). Turkey has a vested interest in the continued denial of the Armenian Genocide, and the government will continue to combat all those who oppose the denial because for decades it is all they have known. Behind the wall of denial is fear.

There are several reasons as to why Turks fear recognition of the Armenian Genocide and one of the more prominent reasons is fear of reparations. After the official recognition and apology from Germany, Holocaust survivors and descendents began receiving *Widergutmachung*, which is German for *reparations* and roughly translates into English as “to make good again.” Turks know that if the Armenian Genocide is recognized then reparations to survivors and descendents are possible. Since the Genocide occurred over 92 years ago many of the survivors have already died. Turkey has been denying the genocide for the same amount of time, and descendents could argue the right to receive reparations that would have been given to their ancestors – namely land reparations. The entire eastern landmass of Turkey was once inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Armenians prior to the genocide and theoretically the land would still belong to Armenians today if it were not for the systematic deportation and annihilation of the minority group.

Another reason why Turks deny the Armenian Genocide is because Armenian’s repressed history has been left out of “official” histories. For 92 years the Turkish government has socialized their citizens to believe the deportations and massacres of the

Ottoman Armenians during 1915-1923 were necessary actions taken to protect the Empire from treason. Ottoman Armenians have been depicted as traitors to the Ottoman Empire and a threat to Pan-Turkism ideals. Pope and Pope (1997) cite a passage from a leading textbook in Turkey that discusses the Armenian Genocide, but the authors of the textbook frame the events in such a way that one cannot help but believe the Turkish government's anti-Armenian /anti-Genocide rhetoric:

The Russians used the Armenians as a cat's paw. Thinking they would achieve independence, they attacked their innocent Turkish neighbours. The Armenian 'committees' massacred tens of thousands of Turkish men, women and children. This made it hard to wage war on the Russians. So the Ottoman state decided in 1915 to forcibly remove the Armenians from the battlefields to Syria. This was the right decision. During the migration some of the Armenians lost their lives due to weather conditions and insecurity... the *Turkish Nation* [original emphasis] is currently not responsible for what happened during the Armenian migration. Thousands of Armenians arrived in Syria and there lived on under the protection of the Turkish state. (P.42)

The reality of the events is not as clear-cut as the Turkish textbook would like students to believe. There are hundreds, if not thousands of survivor testimonies, archival photographs, documentation of first-hand eyewitness accounts by diplomats, missionaries, and reporters that disprove each and every statement made in that single textbook paragraph.¹⁶ Yet despite all of the evidence to disprove the Turkish government's claims, Turks staunchly believe in their government's distortion of the truth. The reason Turks can continue to deny the Genocide is because they have never

¹⁶ According to Stephan Astourian (1990), "The proof of premeditation and intent lies in the fifty-two official documents that Naim Bey, an Ottoman official employed in the Deportation Office at Aleppo, gave Aram Andonian, an Armenian intellectual and survivor, after the British occupied that city in 1918. These documents establish without the shadow of a doubt the intent and involvement of the highest Ottoman authorities, in particular Talât Pasa, the then Minister of the Interior and the strong man of the ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress." (p.116).

been taught the truth. I am saddened for the children of Turkey because their educational system has let them down.

One of the more recent arguments made by the current government in Turkey builds off of the various denial rhetoric mentioned above and combines them to conclude: *there was no systematic attempt by the Ottoman Empire's government to eradicate Armenians from the Empire through means of genocide*. Yet, with Turkey's current bid for a spot in the EU, they are facing mounting pressure from the international community to come clean with their past and recognize the Armenian Genocide. The pressure is finally forcing Turkey to analyze their past, but as Article 301 shows, they are far from opening up dialogue around the incidents. The new spin Turks use to deny the genocide alleges that the *massacres* of the Armenians *may* have occurred but not by the Ottoman Turkish government and surely not during the current regime's rule. The current Turkish government then backtracks and makes the claim that even if the *alleged massacres* occurred under the Ottoman Empire's authority, their State was founded after WWI and is not responsible for their predecessor's actions. Papazian (1986) claims:

When modern Turkey refers to 'alleged' massacres of Armenians in Turkey during World War I, it ignores a damning abundance of evidence, slanders the dead and offends a proud and long-frustrated nationalism. That is what the valid grievance of Armenians around the world is. (P.12)

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is credited with being the founder of the present day Republic of Turkey and also being its first President. In order to cleanse themselves of responsibility, Turks rely on the fact that Atatürk was not physically involved in the actual genocide of the Armenians. Yet, he was the leader of the government that came into power directly after the CUP, and he personally chose to not prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide.

As noted in chapter three, Atatürk's hands are not free of Armenian blood, because during the years of 1920-1923, tens of thousands more Armenians were massacred under his authorization (Miller and Miller 1993). Atatürk's "Turkey for the Turks" is the official successor state of the Ottoman Empire and therefore it does have a role in the Genocide, specifically the denial.

United States' Official Response to Armenian Genocide

Robert McAfee Brown notes in the preface of Elie Wiesel's book "Night," that individuals who in the face of absolute fact and whom to this day continue to disbelieve the tragedy of the Jewish Holocaust are, "committing the greatest indignity human beings can inflict on one another: telling people who have suffered excruciating pain and loss that their pain and loss were illusions. Perhaps there is a greater indignity; it is committed by those who believe them." (p.v-vi). In the case of the Armenian Genocide, Turkey has perpetrated denial propaganda, and the United States has chosen to believe their lies. Armenians have faced a wall of silence when it comes to U.S. policy (or lack there of) regarding the Armenian Genocide. The United States government claims to have "no official stance" on the matter of Turkey and the Armenians, but I would say active cover up and denial of historical evidence is taking a stance.

The Armenian Assembly of America (1988) discussed "Politics and the Armenian Genocide" in their Armenian Genocide commemoration pamphlet:

Despite the overwhelming evidence, official U.S. acknowledgement of the genocide became a contentious issue in 1982, when the State Department suddenly began referring to the "ambiguous" facts of the massacres.

Since that time, the Armenian-American community has been urging the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution to designate April 24 as a national day to remember the Armenian Genocide. Such an action would help reaffirm the long-standing U.S. position on the issue. However, the U.S. State Department, along with the Republic of Turkey, have forcefully opposed such a resolution and to date, have blocked congressional action.

Despite this opposition, the Armenian-American community will continue to press for official U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Congress and the State Department and is hopeful that continued public attention to this issue will prevent the repetition of genocide in the generations to come.

Armenian-Americans seek nothing more than a reaffirmation of U.S. history, which for decades the U.S. government clearly and consistently upheld.

The words of the Armenian Assembly of America still resonate, in fact this excerpt is so pertinent to current politics surrounding the Armenian Genocide that it could have been written yesterday. For several decades the U.S. Congress has placed Resolutions on the floor of both the House and the Senate to recognize the Genocide, and yet no Resolution has ever been passed. Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert had on numerous occasions blocked a vote in congress that would officially call the treatment inflicted on the Ottoman Armenians during 1915-1923: *Genocide*, and each time he was applauded by Genocide deniers.

There are currently two (almost identical) resolutions in the House and Senate calling for United States to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide. The House Resolution was authored by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) and co-sponsored by 190 lawmakers, while the Senate version was presented by Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill) and supported by 29 senators. House Resolution 106 specifically states the following:

The House of Representatives--

(1) calls upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States

record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the consequences of the failure to realize a just resolution; and

(2) calls upon the President in the President's annual message commemorating the Armenian Genocide issued on or about April 24, to accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide and to recall the proud history of United States intervention in opposition to the Armenian Genocide. (House Resolution 106 2007).

There is an Armenian Caucus in congress with over 100 members. The likelihood of Resolution 106 passing once it reaches the floor is quite high, though Speaker Pelosi – a long-time supporter of the Armenian Cause – has yet to bring the Resolution to the floor. Even without federal recognition, many U.S. politicians have used their positions of authority to personally recognize the Armenian Genocide. Just recently Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), who is also running for U.S. President in 2008, mentioned the Armenian Genocide:

For those who aren't aware, there was a genocide that did take place against the Armenian people. It is one of these situations where we have seen a constant denial on the part of the Turkish Government and others that this occurred. It has become a sore spot diplomatically... (Armenian National Committee of America 2007c.).

Awareness surrounding the Armenian Genocide is truly at its highest peak and this is the first time in decades that a Resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide has garnered so much support from both members of Congress and the American Community.

The fact is simple, during the early years of the Armenian Genocide the United States was one of the first and loudest voices calling an end to the violence perpetrated by the Turkish Government, yet after we slowly became allies with Turkey in later years our government seemed to have a change in feelings. The U.S. is political allies with Turkey; we have access to the Incirlik Air Base in Southern Turkey and control several defense

contracts that are worth millions of dollars in U.S. business with Turkey (Cagaptay 2007). The U.S. government would like the American people to believe that access to Incirlik Air Force base is a strategic necessity for our Military personal *fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*.¹⁷ Yet, if Turkey barred U.S. access to Incirlik Air Base, we have a Military Base in Germany that could supply U.S. Military personal serving in the Middle East with whatever aid they need. Without question, access to Incirlik Air Base is convenient but in no way is it a necessity. Also, if Turkey were to cut ties with the U.S. then they would be at a substantial loss in terms of military equipment and training. As much as Turkey would like to threaten the U.S., they do not hold the upper hand. Yet with that said, the United States has chosen to continue to support Turkey's denial of the Genocide by not condemning it. One might wonder if U.S. support of Turkey is not because of belief in their innocence, but rather their financial contribution to the U.S. economy?

Turkey denies the Genocide and even enacted a law (Article 301) forbidding "Denigration of Turkishness," in which any discussion or recognition of the Armenian Genocide constitutes violation of that law. The U.S. government may not have taken measures quite as far as Turkey has to deny the Genocide, but neglecting to recognize Armenian-American's history is really not much different than outright denying it. Just as the Republic of Turkey has mobilized a Nationalist front to deny the Genocide, the U.S. government has focused its own efforts to support the denial by keeping silent. When former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Evans referred to the "Armenian Genocide"

¹⁷ The United States' Military is currently an "occupying force" in both countries.

he was relieved of his post several months later. The Armenian National Committee of America (2007b.) stated:

In February, 2005, Evans told an audience at UC Berkeley, 'I will today call it the Armenian Genocide... There's no doubt in my mind what happened. I believe in calling things by their name.' As a result of his public statements, Ambassador Evans was recalled from his position prior to the conclusion of his term.

After Ambassador Evans' termination, President Bush nominated Richard E. Hoagland to replace him. Hoagland immediately came under fire from a majority of Senate Foreign Relations Committee members for his statements referring to the Armenian Genocide as "alleged genocide." Even after his effectiveness as potential Ambassador was questioned, President Bush felt Hoagland was the right candidate for the job. Hoagland's nomination was eventually blocked, but President Bush re-nominated him in January 2007. President Bush's recent appeal to congress to, "...reject the proposed resolution defining as genocide the mass killings of Armenians in the closing days of the Ottoman Empire" has shown that even after his promise in the 2001 Presidential elections to recognize "the genocidal acts", his solidarity with Turkey outweighs his promise to his own country (Bush Presses Congress to Block Armenian Genocide Bill 2007).

Richard Hovannisian's (2001) claim that, "Denial of the Armenian Genocide has become fully institutionalized..." (p.2), seems to be right on target. The denial has become part of Turkey, they have re-written their history books to show the Genocide never occurred, they criminalize their own citizens for expressing personal feelings that mention the Genocide and/or denial, terrorize individuals – through threats and vandalism of property – for expressing the truth about the events of 1915-1923 and the current cover

up, and they continue to block international efforts to recognize the Genocide. Just recently a genocide exhibit in the UN visitors lobby titled “Lessons from Rwanda” was dismantled after Turkey objected to the exhibit’s mention of the Armenian Genocide. UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon was pressured by Turkey to remove any reference to the Armenians, and when he asked the creators of the exhibit from Aegis Trust (an anti-genocide NGO) to comply with Turkey’s concerns, they refused. This is just the most recent example of Turkey’s attempt to censor International efforts that would potentially shed light on the Armenian genocide, and silence international authority figures that have decided to support Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide. Yet, even in face of denial there continues to be a strong push towards international efforts calling for Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Armenians and non-Armenians alike realize the impact genocide denial has on the international community and have fought hard to have the survivor’s memories validated and the Genocide recognized.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As implied earlier within this thesis, collective identity is formed around a shared sense of “weness” and “collective agency”, therefore the link between collective identity and collective mobilization is quite strong. Cerulo (1997) speaks to the notion of agency and its link to collective identity within social movements by stating:

Identities emerge and movements ensue because collectives consciously coordinate action; group members consciously develop offenses and defenses, consciously insulate, differentiate, and mark, cooperate and compete, persuade and coerce. (P.393)

Such statements only strengthen the idea of identity politics within collective mobilization and give salience to collective identity processes in regards to social movements. Since framing processes have come to be regarded as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000), it is imperative to critically analyze how framing processes construct social realities and help to create shared meaning. Only after such analysis can we then shed light on the current international movement surrounding the Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide. A critical look into the framing of the movements’ rhetoric will help us understand how collective action may help strengthen feelings of identity among succeeding generation of Armenians (individually and collectively).

Social Movements

Within my research I came across various definitions for what a social movement is, and instead of choosing one definition over another I have combined several to come

up with a running definition. For the purposes of this paper a *social movement* will be defined as: *a type of collective action in which groups of individuals and/or organizations share a common ideology, purpose or goal centered around specific political or social issues and aim to bring about social change.* Research of social movement theory concludes that there are several types of social movements, and each movement varies not only in terms of goals and tactics used to achieve such goals but also in terms of ideology (Benford and Snow 2000; Vago 2004). Within this Chapter, I weave literature of social movements with efforts to have the Armenian Genocide recognized. Primary research on the actual history of social movements that are organized around recognition of the Armenian Genocide should be done in the near future, though due to restraints of this thesis, I only consider framing over the struggle to recognize the Genocide, rather than history of the movement's organization.

Types of Social Movements Based on Ideology

Reform movements – participants generally feel “satisfied with the existing social order but feel that certain reforms are necessary in specific areas” (Vago 2004:218). Participants use the system and *work through the legislative process* to pass particular laws that would better enforce laws already in place or change the laws slightly to mirror their own group ideology. Examples would include U.S. Resolution 106 and the French and Swiss laws that make denial of the Armenian Genocide a criminal offense punishable by several years in prison. In each case there was no need to “overthrow” the

government, only change existing practices in regards to recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Revolutionary movements – participants take their objectives one step further by seeking to replace guiding ideologies, institutions, sometimes entire regimes, based on new governing principles (in accordance with their ideology) (Vago 2004:218).

Participants have a deep dissatisfaction with the existing social order and opt to completely tear it down and start anew. One example would be the CUP's accession to power during the early twentieth century, followed by Atatürk's Nationalist party's foundation of the Republic of Turkey after WWI. Other historical examples would include the American Revolution and Russia's Communist Regime, among many others.

Resistance movements – is unlike other movements in that participants involved are not “advocating change,” rather they seek to resist change and maintain the status quo. An example would be the anti-gun control movement and the Pro-choice movement (after Roe v. Wade). During WWI as a precursor to the concentration camps Jews were placed in ghettos. The same Jews inhabited many ghettos in and around Poland for years before evacuation to concentration camps. The story of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is one of resistance. “Warsaw Jews’ decision to stage resistance runs counter to what opportunity-based explanations of social movement emergence would predict” (Einwohner 2003:670). It was not opportunity that made Jews resist it was the lack thereof. Two harrowing stories of resistance during the Armenian Genocide come from

the “Van Uprising” and the “Battle at Musa Dagh” in which both villages of civilians fought off their attackers with very little weaponry for several weeks.¹⁸

Reactionary movements – are like resistance movements only participants “advocate change” of existing social norms. Participants are somewhat nostalgic in their hopes to return to an older and supposedly better way of life. Examples of such movements would include the American Nazi party, the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society (Vago 2004:218).

Expressive movements – participants accept society as is and only attempt to change feelings from within rather than any actual structure. For example, participants try to change individuals rather than directly trying to change institutions or laws. Examples of such groups would be Evangelical groups who try to radically transform people’s lives through religious ideology (Vago 2004:218). Such groups may *frame* their goals through the rhetoric of “personal responsibility.”

Origins from which Social Movements Emerge

Theories that describe the factors that enable such movements to arise are: *Strain Theory, Resource-Mobilization Theory, and Political-Process Theory* (Marx 1994).

Strain Theory – assumes collective action arises out of some type of strain, implying that people try to cope with the stresses of life in a social system under strain (Marx 1994). Two Strain theories (Marx 1994:78-81) are:

¹⁸ For more detail, see Franz Werfel’s 1934 novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, based on the “Battle of Musa Dagh”.

1. *Collective Behavior* – this model describes social movements as a response to a major disruption in the normal functioning of society (e.g. the Armenian Genocide and loss of historic homeland). Rapid social change is a potential trigger for collective action.
2. *Mass Society Theory* – unlike collective behavior theory, it is not rapid social change but widespread social isolation that triggers collective action. Individuals turn to social movements for a sense of community when they do not have a connection to religious, political, or social groups (e.g. the Armenian Diaspora and collective action around the Armenian Cause).

“Groups can also use images of the past and struggles over history as vehicles for establishing their power or, perversely, lack of power” (Olick and Robbins 1998:127).

Marx (1994) notes that:

Strain theories suggest that movements arise in response to social disorganization in society. In this view, movements provide one means by which people attempt to cope with the stress and anxiety caused by social change and disorganization. (P.85)

Social Strain theory understates the extent to which social disorganization is always present in social life and therefore is an inadequate explanation of social movements.

Resource-Mobilization Theory – argues that there is always sufficient strain in society to serve as motivation for collective action. Resource-mobilization theorists argue that it is not the motivation to organize that varies but the organizational resources required to do so. For example, an increase in resources encourages the development of a social movement (Marx 1994:81-83).

Political-Process Theory – argues that society is an elaborate system of power relations that grants some groups routine access to power while denying it to others (Marx 1994). There are *members* (those who have routine access to power) and *challengers* (those lacking such access). Political-process theorists argue that social movements develop in response to an increase in the “structure of political opportunities” available to a particular challenging group (i.e. an increase in power encourages the development of a social movement) (Marx 1994:83-84).

Marx (1994) concludes by saying, “*Resource-Mobilization and Political-Process* theories emphasize the political function of social movements. Movements are the means by which relatively powerless segments of society seek to improve the conditions of their lives” (p.85). Social movement’s life cycles are not considerably long lasting; therefore activists must mobilize quickly and formulate an ideology that will unite their potential supporters. Groups must share an identity construction and create a shared vision if they are truly going to mobilize their constituents and create change; it is through the use of tactics and framing processes that such tasks are made possible.

Strategies and Tactics in Social Movements

In regards to tactics, Marx (1994) notes that social movements’:

Most powerful means of influence at their disposal are the goals they choose to pursue and the tactics they utilize in this pursuit. Both are used to compete with other [Social Movement Organizations] SMOs, persuade authorities, neutralize opponents, and gain access to the media. SMOs uses it’s goals and tactics to mediate between the conflicting demands imposed on it by these various groups. (P.107)

Goals and Tactics shape the nature and extent of the opposition Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) encounter (Marx 1994:109). Strategy refers to a general design or plan of action, and tactic refers to a specific means or method of carrying out that plan or design (Vago 2004:381). Tactics are what SMOs use to get group goals met. According to Silveira (2001) there are three Strategies social movement organizations can employ: *Direct Action, Litigation, and Utilizing the Legal System through Collective Action Framing.*

Direct Action – includes tactics such as protesting, demonstrations, rioting, sit-ins, marches, and any other action that brings the movement’s agenda and goals to the forefront of viewer’s attention (i.e. in your face type of behavior). Such actions are meant to be disruptive and confrontational mainly because it is the only avenue in which marginalized voices are heard. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) is a grassroots SMO that has been fighting hard for the Armenian Cause. Through protests, rallies, action alerts, petitions and much more, the ANCA have on several occasions lobbied Congress to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Their job is to inform the masses about the Armenian Cause and they will continue to fight until the Genocide is recognized. The Rock band System of a Down is comprised of several members with Armenian heritage. They have rallied support from their fans to help push the U.S. Congress towards passing a Resolution that would recognize the Armenian Genocide. Just recently the band made a documentary about the denial of the Armenian Genocide called, “SCREAMERS.” The band has set up several demonstrations on Capital Hill and various venues around the world protesting Turkey’s Denial. Through their music and

protests, they have brought worldwide attention to the denial of the Armenian Genocide. Every year thousands of people around the world recognize the Armenian Genocide and with support from groups like System of a Down, more people are aware of the fight.

Bakalian (1989) notes:

The Genocide is remembered every year on April 24. On that day in 1915 the Turkish government rounded up all the Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul. They were all subsequently murdered. April 24 stands for all the acts of violence committed against the Armenian people during that period. The genocide is commemorated by requiems in all Armenian churches as well as public gatherings, marches, rallies, speeches and special events like tree planting and wreath laying ceremonies, concerts, plays and so on. (P.438)

Litigation – includes taking legal action (but this type of strategy assumes there are resources available for such tactics). As noted by Silveira (2001), “legal action is generally effective in grass roots mobilization only in concert with other tactics, like demonstrations, lobbying, collective bargaining and media mobilization” (p.528-529). In the face of Turkish denial and Turkish law banning recognition of the Genocide, several Countries/Parliaments have officially recognized the Armenian Genocide. As mentioned several times throughout this thesis, France and Switzerland have combated Turkey’s Article 301 by enacting their own laws that criminalize the *denial* of the Genocide. Also, the current Resolution set to go before Congress is another example of litigation strategies that have helped bring attention to the Armenian Cause.

Utilizing the Legal System through Collective Action Framing – basically entails the use of legal rhetoric to get a goal across. “By using such language, social movements attain legitimacy with the general population, and can often use the legal system to compel change without ever gaining the support of the courts through litigation” (Silveira

2001:530). A basic example is when activists fighting for immigrant rights at a demonstration in Sacramento California, developed a movement platform framed as “IMMIGRANT RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS” scrolled in bold letters and five languages (Fujiwara 2005:89). The message was written everywhere and helped bring the argument back to immigrants as humans deserving basic ‘human rights’. Armenians have also utilized the legal system through collective action framing by using the rally cry “Never Again”. Armenians argue that recognition is needed in order to show the international community that genocide will not go unrecognized. Based on the fact that Hitler refers to the Armenian Genocide and the lack of punishment faced by the perpetrators before he authorized the annihilation of the Jews in Europe, Armenians shout “Never Again”. The hope is that “Never Again” will genocide happen, but if it does (as in the current matter of Darfur) “Never Again” will it be denied.

Framing

Since the mid 1980’s academics have made a strong link between framing and social movements (Benford and Snow 2000). The concepts of collective action frames and framing processes help to define social movements and illuminate Social Movement Organization’s goals and tactics. Framing constructs meaning for movement participants and opposers (Benford and Snow 2000).

The concept of frame as used in social movements is derived from Erving Goffman’s work. Goffman (1974:21) coined the term to refer to schemata used by individuals to organize, perceive, and make sense of their experiences in the world, may

or may not reflect reality, and is constantly evolving as events and existing personal attitudes interact. Framing helps to render events or occurrences *meaningful* and thereby functions to organize experience and guide action (Benford and Snow 2000; Haines 2006). Scott (2000:786) notes that, “Framing explicates how movement actors ‘assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’” (also noted in Kowalchuk 2005:240). When an individual’s interests, values, and beliefs resonate with a social movement organization’s core frames the greater chance the framing effort will find success (Snow et al. 1986). *Frame Alignment* occurs when resonance of frames is produced between individuals and social movement organizations.

Frame Alignment Processes

As defined by Snow et al. (1986), *frame alignment* is “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complimentary” (p.464). Scott (2000) states, “Frame alignment theory suggests that framing – the process of meaning work – is a deliberate and more or less linear process. That is, activists deploy meaning in a formal, discursive manner in order to mobilize constituency to action” (p.786). *Framing* denotes an active procession phenomenon that implies *agency* (i.e. an ongoing accomplishment). Cerulo (1997), speaks to the notion of agency within social movements-framing, by stating:

Identities emerge and movements ensue because collectives consciously coordinate action; group members consciously develop offenses and defenses, consciously insulate, differentiate, and mark, cooperate and compete, persuade and coerce. (P.393)

It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of Social Movement Organizations or movement activists (Benford and Snow 2000). Polletta and Jasper (2001) state, “When successful, frames make a compelling case for the ‘injustice’ of the condition and the likely effectiveness of collective ‘agency’ in changing that condition” (p.291). Benford and Snow (2004) express the importance of the activist’s role in ‘framing’ the meaning behind the particular social movement by stating:

Social movements are not merely carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies – rather, it is movement actors that are signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers. (P.613)

Such statements only strengthen the idea of identity politics within collective mobilization and give salience to framing processes in regards to collective action.

Collective Action Frames “are the product of framing – they constitute the shared meaning, the common definition of the situation acted upon by movement participants.” (Scott 2000:786). They are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a Social Movement Organizations (Benford and Snow 2000). Silveira (2001) defines Collective Action Frames as involving:

The use of symbols and language to express a movement’s message and is essential to a movement’s success. Collective Action Frames accentuate a movement’s message and involves selectively coding events through socially constructed cultural symbols, which are then interwoven with the actual movement in the cultural matrix. (P.530)

The commemoration poster that read, “In 1915 there were no concentration camps, there was only the Syrian Desert” is just one of hundreds of frames used by Armenian Genocide supporters to show the severity and reality of the Genocide. Even though collective action frames can vary from one social movement organization to another in terms of the problems or issues addressed, or in terms of a group’s flexibility, inclusively, degree of resonance (i.e. credibility), etc., Benford and Snow (2000:615-618), point to *Three Core Framing Tasks* associated with all collective action frames. Participant mobilization depends on how well each of the following tasks is attended. The tasks are: *Diagnostic Framing*, *Prognostic Framing*, and *Motivational Framing*.

Diagnostic Framing is the first of three core framing tasks associated with collective action frames in which the group identifies a “social or political problem” and looks at the causes attributed to the “problem.” In the case of the international movement to recognize the Armenian Genocide, efforts have been hampered by the Turkish government’s continued denial of the events, and their unrelenting attempt to block access to archival evidence.

Prognostic Framing is the next task in which participants of the movement come together and articulate a proposed solution to the “problem” or at least a plan of attack and a strategy for carrying out the plan. Dr. Ronald G. Suny and his colleagues Kevork Bardakjian, and Fatma Müge Göçek planned a “workshop to bring Armenian, Turkish and other scholars together to present work on the minority peoples in the last years of the Ottoman rule” (Suny

2005:11). The workshops served as a forum to discuss the various interpretations of the deportations and massacres of the Ottoman Armenians during 1915-1923 (i.e. was it genocide or not?). The workshop was called “WATS (Workshop in Armenian-Turkish Studies) and was first held at University of Chicago on March 17-19, 2000 (Suny 2004; Suny 2005). The series of workshops continued: “at the University of Michigan (2002), Minnesota (2003), Salzburg, Austria (2004), and New York University (2005)” (Suny 2005). Several prominent scholars attended the workshops and helped open up dialogue surrounding the Armenian Genocide.

Motivational Framing is the final core framing task associated with collective action frames, whereby movement participants rationalize their actions through the appropriate vocabularies that will hopefully resonate with the larger public sphere. Even though the United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was not adopted until 1948, Lemkin called the Armenian Massacres under the Ottoman Empire, Genocide. Armenian activists and allies continue to use this language and framing in order to motivate the larger public to pressure Turkey to come to terms with its past and officially recognize the Armenian Genocide. The word genocide resonates with the public and is foundation of the Armenian Cause.

Other Conditions that May Affect or Constrain Framing Efforts

Frame Disputes within the Movement – are intramovement disagreements that usually occur in regards to participants differing opinions regarding diagnostic and

prognostic framing tasks (Benford and Snow 1986). In terms of the International efforts to recognize the Armenian Genocide, there really is no dispute among movement participants on the diagnostic framing (i.e. Turkish Denial of the Genocide), but rather disputes on the prognostic framing tasks (i.e. recognition, apology, restitution, etc.). Many participants feel that an official recognition and genuine apology will suffice, yet other participants want restitution as well. All participants agree that Turkey's recognition of the Genocide is the first step towards reconciliation. Some Armenians feel that an apology would be too late, but that they are still owed recognition and restitution. My father knows that restitution will most likely not come in his lifetime, and maybe not even a genuine apology. Yet, he still yearns for recognition, so that in his heart he can finally reconcile with the fact that his father's pain and the death of grandparents, aunts, and uncles were not in vain. I am young enough to know that in time Armenians will be able to lay their dead to rest, and all of my ancestors that have passed before me will finally be at peace. In a perfect world we (Armenians) would receive an official recognition, official apology, and restitution, but in reality we many only get recognition.

Relevance of the frame to the realities of the participants – a frame must be relevant to participants and encompass the interests and or points of view that resonate with them (Snow et al. 1986). Cultural meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, etc., provide a lens through which frames are interpreted and evaluated (Benford and Snow 2000), therefore it is important for SMO frames to fall in alignment with participants' existing cultural foundations.

Counterframing from Opponents, Bystanders and the Media – such groups rebut, undermine, or attempt to neutralize social movement organization’s beliefs and ideology. Present day Turkey has exhausted all resources in order to re-write history and deny recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The government has not only distorted the truth in their textbooks and everyday dialogue within their own borders, but they have even gone as far as threatening dissident’s freedom of speech and safety abroad for recognizing the Genocide. The Turkish Government has heavily protested International Resolutions recognizing the Armenian Genocide, while also systematically denying any effort to silence dialogue around the events of 1915-1923. The Turkish press consistently frames the deportations of Armenians during WWI as a necessary precaution to combat Armenian rebellion, and claims that the deaths were not part of a systematic plan to exterminate the Armenian population, but if anything, resulted from *civil war*. In the recent past, the Turkish media also referred to “current Armenian terrorism” in relation to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; “In Turkey Armenians were even accused of secretly aiding the Kurdish revolt, even leading it!” (Suny 2004:3). Such rhetoric only fuels the divide between Turks and Armenians. As quoted earlier by Hovannisian (2001) “Denial of the Armenian Genocide has become fully institutionalized...” (p.2). Therefore, any hope for reconciliation falls to the participants of social movement efforts, for they are the proponents of the truth and will fight in face of adversity.

In the case of the Armenian Genocide, international efforts to bring recognition to the cause have gathered momentum, and with the rally cry “Never Again” supporters have strengthened the movement to end genocide and genocide denial. Participants have

collectively organized around the Armenian Cause, and through *direct action* tactics such as: protests, demonstrations, lobbying efforts, and outright rebellion, the movement's progress has become a source of strife for the Turkish Government's campaign of Genocide denial. As noted earlier, primary research on the actual history of social movements that are organized around recognition of the Armenian Genocide should be done in the near future. Collective action has the power to bring about change, and clearly the current efforts surrounding the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the use of "Genocide" frames have allowed (and will continue to allow) open dialogue amongst Turks and Armenians.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Adolf Hitler, considered by much of society to be the mastermind behind one of the most horrific crimes against humanity in human history, mentioned the Armenian Genocide before he commanded his troops to invade Poland. Hitler used the Armenian Genocide as blue print for his planned annihilation of the Jews in Europe. The world's citizens were bystanders and let the perpetrators of the Genocide go without punishment. Hitler recognized the indifference and used it as precedent for his own massacres. As cliché as it sounds: *Those who fail to recognize history are doomed to repeat it.* Genocide does not just happen over night. Yet, even with indicators people still disregard the facts of genocide. Genocide can be stopped; why should we wait until entire cultures are wiped out before we as an international community acknowledge the severity of the crime? Moreover, when we are faced with overwhelming evidence that proves genocide occurred and at which government's hands, we should confront the crimes and perpetrators with great speed and severe punishment. How can the international community (especially the Government of the United States) preach an end to genocide when there is truly no deterrence for governments who commit such heinous acts? Do we pick and chose which government should be held accountable based on our political ties?

How can the international community turn its back on millions of innocent people who have lost their life due to genocidal acts? We discredit the survivor and witness testimonies of genocide and by doing so we silence their identity. Whose right to life are we trying to preserve? What will it take to enact justice and credit the memories of

trauma faced by survivors. Armenians have based their sense of identity around the genocide, while Turks identity has been built on lies, and has become synonymous with the denial. Misinformation among Turkey's own people means that they are ignorant of our history because they have been socialized to believe the rhetoric behind the denial. Maybe the only chance for recognition is through social movement efforts. The memories that shape the identities of those fighting for justice are incredibly important for a successful movement outcome, and it is through the sharing of memories that future generations gain a sense of "we-ness" (Cerulo 1997). Cornell (2000) asserts, "keeping the memory of the injustice alive and mourning the victims through political education about the historical crime is the best way to do justice to the collective legacy" (p.10). While on his way to the Nazi gas chambers, Jewish Historian Simon Dubnow used his last bit of energy to shout to people he passed along the route, "Record Everything! Remember!" (Charny 1982:13). His words are raw; they leave me shaken.

The UN Convention on Genocide is supposed to be the governing body on crimes against humanity, and yet the UN still will not recognize the events of 1915-1923 in the Ottoman Empire as Genocide against the Armenians. The UN must take a stand against Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide. Lemkin himself cited the Armenian Massacres in early drafts of this definition of genocide. Why is it so hard to call this specific case genocide? Hundreds of independent scholars (with no connection to any government), along with dozens of countries and Parliaments around the world have recognized the Armenian Genocide. Forty States in the U.S. have officially recognized the Genocide, and yet the U.S. Federal Government still refuses to condemn the acts as

genocide. Our countries (the U.S. and Turkey) not only benefit from one another, but we also benefit from the denial of the Armenian Genocide. The American government will not have to admit its inaction during the Genocide if Turkey does not admit to the Genocide in the first place. There is a State investment in the denial and it has been through the efforts of grassroots activism on the behalf of the Armenian Cause, that such institutionally entrenched patterns of denial have been brought to light.

The Ottoman Turkish Government committed genocide against its Armenian population and though the current Republic of Turkey is not to blame for authorizing the genocide, the new administration is responsible for the cover up. The first step Turkey can take towards reconciliation is to admit their ancestors committed genocide against the Ottoman Armenians, and apologize for their current role in the distortion of history. With one apology Turkey could correct 92 years of pain and suffering. Literature on forgiveness and reconciliation says that without an “official genuine apology” or at least an “official recognition of guilt,” forgiveness and reconciliation cannot occur. If Turkey can accept responsibility for its guilt, then Armenians can finally begin to let go of the weight bearing down on their souls. In fact, there is a culture of apology today in which hundreds of political, religious, and business leaders have openly, publicly, and genuinely apologized for what they have done – either contemporaneously or historically. Oliner (2007) and his associates mention that there is a positive correlation between altruism, genuine apology and reconciliation. One example that Oliner (2007) gives is that German leaders have apologized to the Jewish people as well as Israel for the Holocaust. The outcome of this apology has only strengthened relations between the two nations.

Survivors of genocide and their descendents especially deserve an apology because the weight of holding such traumatic experiences inside is almost as bad as experiencing them firsthand.

The memories of the Genocide will live on, and new generations of Armenians will frame their identity around them. If and when Turkey officially recognizes the Armenian Genocide, Armenians will then have the opportunity to move past the grievances. Whether or not Armenians choose to forgive Turkey is another story. Memories cannot be erased simply because others discredit them but they can be put to rest when acknowledged. “Justice has not been rendered, and the Armenians cannot put their dead to rest. One and a half million souls seem to haunt them” (Perroomian 2005:230). The time has come in the culture of apology that seems to exist today, for Turkey to stop mincing words and come clean. The apology Armenians seek has more to do with the current Republic’s denial of the Genocide, than an apology for their ancestor’s actions. Therefore recognition of the Genocide and an apology for the denial surrounding the Genocide is what social movement participants are seeking. That is not to say that an apology from Turkey for their ancestor’s actions would not be welcomed, but it is not the apology Armenians seek from the present day Republic. It helps to be genuinely sorry, but in reality the movement’s supporters are pushing for recognition of the Genocide and an apology for the denial.

The denial has overshadowed the crimes, and when people like Condoleezza Rice insist that Turks and Armenians need to resolve their own history, come to terms with it and move on, they must recognize that *moving on* is part of process involving recognition

and apology – two things Turks want no part of.¹⁹ We know that Turkey is not willing to reconcile their past when: innocent intellectuals like Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink are criminalized by their own country (which claims to be democratic) for discussing the Genocide; when Turkish Nationalists (like the individuals that hacked into the forgottengenocide.org site and replaced its contents with Genocide denial propaganda) terrorize freedom of speech and threaten supporters of the Armenian Cause with physical violence; when the same Turkish Nationalist's can shoot and kill an innocent journalist in broad daylight, in front of his office, simply because he (Hrant Dink) called upon his country to admit their role in the Armenian Genocide; when their own government knows of an impending assassination of a supporter of the Armenian Cause (Hrant Dink) and does nothing to stop it; and finally, when faced with undeniable evidence proving Genocide, they continue to deny any wrongdoing. Turkey's journey towards reconciling their past will be long, and can only begin when they chose to end their silence.

As part of ending their silence, Turkey should take another important step and open the archival government documents and other archival evidence surrounding the Armenian Genocide (i.e. witness testimony, official documents of the Ottoman Empire's government, pictures, etc.), so that it may be analyzed. Currently the Turkish government refuses access to these records. Additionally, it is unreasonable for the current Turkish Government to assert that the debate over the Armenian Genocide should be left up to the

¹⁹ "U.S. Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA) Questioning Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice...Regarding the State Department's Efforts to Defeat Legislation Recognizing the Armenian Genocide." 2007. U.S. House Appropriation Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations Retrieved March 29, 2007 (<http://www.genocide1915.info/media/rice.asp>).

historians to decide,²⁰ when in fact they face mounting evidence that already proves the genocide occurred and was in fact State Sponsored. Rather than employing a select group of mainly Turkish historians – whose allegiance to the Republic of Turkey is undeniable – to ‘handle’ the research into the validity of the Genocide, Turkey should open the archives to the public and pay heed the claims already made by hundreds of international scholars with no connection to any government, who have already asserted the validity of the Armenian Genocide.

Recognizing the crimes that Ottoman Turks inflicted on their Armenian neighbors during 1915-1923 as acts of genocide is the first step the U.S. can take towards righting past wrongs. The U.S. must become an advocate for change. We must not be complacent or scared into submission; NEVER AGAIN should we be bystanders to genocide or genocide denial. The U.S. can and should speak out against Turkey’s continuous denial of the Genocide, because as political allies we not only have a shared stake in Turkey’s denial of the Genocide, but we also have a shared role in their distortion of history. Without aid from the United States the Turkish Military would no longer be the powerful entity it claims to be. We are in the best strategic position to rally for Turkey’s recognition of the Genocide because we hold the upper hand in terms of aid and business to the Turkish Military defense and economy. Turkey’s denial is becoming increasingly problematic for them as they try to get into the European Union. Though the EU has said that recognition of the Genocide is not a prerequisite for Turkey’s admittance, several

²⁰ In the late 1980’s Prime Minister at the time, Turgut Özal asserted that modern Turkey was not responsible for the events of the Ottoman era and therefore the debate should be “left in the hands of the historians” (Pope and Pope 1997:47).

Parliaments including Germany (whom leads the EU in seats), France and Italy (follows Germany with the 2nd and 3rd highest seat count) have all officially recognized the Armenian Genocide within their own countries and believe Turkey should do the same.

It is my contention that by not condemning the acts committed against the Armenian people during WWI by the Ottoman Turkish Empire as *Genocide*, the United States government is continuing to *distort history* and *cover up a lie* all due to political ties with Turkey. The current government of Turkey continues to adamantly deny any Turkish responsibility for the State-sponsored deaths of two-thirds of the Armenian population during WWI and the deportation/ exile of the remaining third of the population into the Syrian Desert. The current government of Turkey argues that Armenian casualties did not amount to such high numbers, and they claim that more Turkish civilians lost their lives at the hands of the Armenians. Turkey notes that if any Armenians lost their lives they were merely “*casualties of war.*”

By denying the acts were State-sponsored, the Turkish Government is essentially continuing the process of Genocide against the descendents of those massacred. The deportation and massacre of the Armenians during WWI were not *casualties of war* nor were they *unfortunate tragedies*; they were calculated and executed with precision. The lack of recognition on the part of Turkey is not an *unfortunate tragedy*; rather it too is a calculated act and ninety-two years later, one which the United States Government stands beside. Rather than align itself with Turkey, the United States should stand beside the rest of the International community and denounce the Turkish persecution of the Armenian people during WWI as *Genocide*.

There is no doubt in my mind that if we are ever to better the welfare of humanity, the Armenian Genocide must be officially recognized and Turkey must be held accountable for their denial. The story of the Armenians must be told because to deny the story is simply a continuation of genocide on the Armenian people. I am a living descendent of a genocide survivor, and it is not only my duty but also my honor to keep the memory of the Armenian Genocide alive. I will carry on the memories of my grandfather and my father, and I will transfer those memories onto my own children, because the only way to keep our culture alive is to keep the memories alive. One day the nation of Turkey will be held accountable for their actions, and when the day of recognition comes our ancestors' souls will finally be put to rest. The question of whether or not the United States will have a role in holding Turkey accountable is yet to be seen. Yet, the efforts for justice are in place and the movement for recognition is strong.

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* A copy of Hovannisian's 2001 article was sent in "word format" via email correspondence to my thesis committee member Dr. Samuel Oliner. I do not have the article in the format written for Roth and Maxwell's edited volume, though the content itself is the same. This is the reason for the difference in page numbers. The word document is numbered pages 1-34, while the article in the edited volume is numbered pages 796-812.

** As noted within my thesis, on March 15th 2007 I logged onto *theforgotten.org* (an educational website documenting the Armenian Genocide), and realized it had been hacked by a third party. All of the original material and videos are no longer accessible from this site, as they have been deleted and replaced with Turkish Nationalist propaganda. I am in possession of the 46 short clips of testimony, from 27 (survivors and witnesses) that was originally posted on the website prior to the hacking. On April 22nd 2007, I was made aware of the new URL for *theforgotten.org*- the new website (with all of the original data- including the survivor testimonies) can be found at: <http://www.theforgottengenocide.org>. At this time the video footage cannot be downloaded.

Documentaries Viewed During Research

The Armenian Genocide, 60 min. Produced by: Two Cats Productions.

California Armenians: The First Generation, 30 min. Produced by The Armenian Film Foundation.

Cilicia...Rebirth, 27 min. Produced by: The Armenian Film Foundation.

Excerpts from LEGACY...the Armenian Heritage through Motion Pictures, 23 min.
Narrated by George Deukmajian, Mike Connors, and Walter Karabian. Produced by: The Armenian Film Foundation.

The Forgotten Genocide, 28 min. Narrated by Mike Connors. Produced by: Atlantis Productions, Inc.

The Hidden Holocaust: The First Genocide of the Twentieth Century, 45 min. Produced by: A&E Productions.

Historical Armenia, 53 min. Narrated by Guy Runnion. Produced by: Atlantis Productions, Inc.

Soviet Armenia, 15 min. Produced by: Atlantis Productions, Inc.

Supplement to The Forgotten Genocide, 17 min. Narrated by Mike Connors. Produced by: Atlantis Productions, Inc.